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COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA: A QUANTITATIVE REVIEW 
by 
Michael F. McAuliffe 
Introduction 
While Virginia's appellate court system is one of the oldest in the nation,l it 
has only recently joined the majority of states with a tiered appellate system2 by 
adding an intermediate appellate court (lAC). The Court of Appeals of Virginia 
commenced operation on January I, 1985, and its operating experiences in the past 
two and one-half years provide a valuable set of quantitative data from which a 
preliminary statistical performance evaluation is possible. 
At the present time, no caseload/workload analysis exists comparing 
Virginia's intermediate appellate court experience with other sample states. A 
statistical profile of the transition from a single court appellate system to a tiered 
appellate court structure provides information vital in assessing the system's 
strengths and weaknesses and thus is a useful tool for judicial policymaking. 
The present article (I) develops a framework for evaluating the performance 
of the court by defining the relevant performance variables, (2) compares ths: 
experience of adding an intermediate appellate court with other states that added 
an intermediate appellate court after 1980, and (3) briefly discusses the policy 
implications of a quantitative snapshot of the court's operations. 
Limitations 
The present work does not evaluate the Court of Appeals of Virginia or the 
other sampled courts by the quality of decisionmaking or the degree of "just" 
results. While inferences may be offered in terms of how the quantitative variables 
may affect the legal functioning of the court, they are made in a general context 
and specific applications of such comments are left for the reader. 
Also, statistical analysis is dependent on the integrity of the data set and of 
I The OTlgms of the court date back to the Quarter Court of 1623. For a 
brief historical discussion of Virginia's appellate system, see THE STATE OF THE 
JUDICIARY REPORT 27 (Virginia 1986) [hereinafter JUDICIARY REPORT, 1986]. 
2 Comment, The Virginia Judicial Council's Intermediate Court Proposal, 16 U. 
RICH. L. REV. 209 (1981); see STATE COURT ORGANIZATION, 1987 (National 
Center for State Courts 1987) (publication available to public in January, 1988). 
The states, as of 1986, that have an intermediate appellate court(s) are Alabama, 
Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, 
Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, 
North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, 
Texas, Virginia, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin. 
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the ability to control for other variables. Thus, while the methodology employed in 
this article appears to be sound,3 the conclusions must nevertheless be tentative. 
The Development of the Court of Appeals of Virginia 
A brief discussion of the goals and objectives relevant to the creation of the 
court of appeals is necessary to provide a baseline expectation measure in 
evaluating the court's performance using statistical criteria. A comprehensive 
analysis of the circumstances and issues leading to the creation of the court of 
appeals is covered in several earlier works.4 
With the passage of the present state constitution in 1970, which explicitly 
gave the legislature the power to create an intermediate appellate court,5 the 
movement for legislative action intensified.6 Several studies were completed that 
attempted to provide a suitable justification for adding another appellate court.7 
Concerns about the appellate court system centered on (I) appellate caseload 
trends, (2) total appellate capacity, (3) the incentive to appeal a case and (4) 
judicial resources.8 
Appellate court performance, however, was typically not discussed in terms of 
workload measures (e.g.; disposition rates as a percentage of filings and other 
processing measures such as time standards). The appellate debate, throughout the 
1960's and 70's, primarily focused on the input (filings) of the appellate system 
only reinforcing the input argument with assertions of delay and other workload 
3 The table data (filings and dispositions) are taken from the state judicial 
annual reports of Idaho, South Carolina and Virginia for the years covered in the 
tables. Minnesota's data are from the state appellate statistical profiles on file 
with the Court Statistics and Information Management Project (CSIM) of the 
National Center for State Courts (NCSC). Thus, the origin of the raw numbers are 
from the administrative office of the state court systems and reflect the most 
complete data set available for each state. The standard computations are (I) sums 
of filings and dispositions and (2) dispositions as a percentage of filings for all 
individual courts and for the state totals. Dispositions as a percentage of filings 
should adequately approximate the input/output ratio of the court(s). This 
computation should give a more accurate picture of how a court or court system 
processes cases than does mere filings or dispositions data alone. Time standard 
analysis (the time necessary to complete the various parts of an appeal, i.e. 
docketing to oral argument) would also present useful information concerning 
consumption of judicial resources. Unfortunately, such information is currently not 
available for the majority of state appellate courts. 
4 One of the earliest and most comprehensive works is Lilly and Scalia, 
Appellate Justice: A Crisis in Virginia? 57 VA. L. REV. 3 (1971); see also Comment, 
supra note 2. 
5 VA. CONST. art. VI, 2. 
6 See VIRGINIA COURT ORGANIZATION STUDY, A REPORT OF THE 
NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS (1979) (an unpublished report submitted 
to the Virginia Judicial Council and available through the National Center for State 
Courts). 
7 See Id. 
8 See Comment, supra note 2, at 210-12. 
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measures.9 Thus, the debate over adding an lAC in Virginia did not provide clear 
measures for later policymakers to use in evaluating the court's performance. 
Additionally, fears of an increased general propensity to litigate and the 
growth in the Commonwealth's population helped form the backdrop for reform 
supporters and opponents to struggle with the issue of how to best address the 
Commonwealth's long-term jUdicial needs. 
By 1982, legislation was introduced into the General Assembly which would 
create an intermediate court of appeals.!O The legislation, in large part, was a 
result of a report by the Judicial Council of Virginia. I I In 1983, the General 
Assembly adopted the legislation creating an intermediate court of appeals to be 
effective January I, 1985. 12 However, the 1984 General Assembly amended the 
earlier legislation and instituted several important changes, including making 
criminal appeals to the lAC discretionary in nature.!3 Thus, when the court 
commenced operation in 1985, its structure and jurisdiction were the product of 
intense and prolonged analysis and compromise. 
The present statutory scheme for the court of appeals provides that the court 
has wide-ranging jurisdiction with a specific degree of finality accorded many of 
its decisions. 14 However, the Supreme Court of Virginia has discretionary 
jurisdiction to review all cases pursuant to statutorily mandated criteria.!5 In 
operation, the court of appeals has exercised a significant level of autonomy with 
only a minimal caseload being processed up to the state supreme court for full 
review.1 6 
Overall, the statutory mandate for the court reveals an overt attempt to 
"down load" specific areas of review and provide a system capable of processing 
appeals with more flexible management mechanisms. Also, this framework allows the 
court of appeals to develop a body of case law, providing all participants in the 
appellate process an increased degree of predictability for potential appeals. 
Thus, the proper context for evaluating the court's performance must account 
for the pre-operation expectations and the perceived needs the court was designed 
to meet. In the case of Virginia's lAC, the available literature suggests that 
9 See, e.g., Note, The Virginia Special Court of Appeals: Constitutional Relief 
for an Overburdened Court, 8 WM & MARY L. REV. 244 (I967); Comment, supra 
note 2, at 211. 
10 Comment, supra note 2, at 209. 
II [d. 
12 THE STATE OF THE JUDICIARY REPORT, 1984 45 (1985) [hereinafter 
JUDICIARY REPORT, 1984]; see VA. CODE ANN. § § 17-116.01 et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1987). 
13 JUDICIARY REPORT, 1984 at 45; see VA. CODE ANN. § 17.116.05.1 (Cum. 
Supp. 1987). 
14 VA. CODE ANN. § 17.116.07 (Cum. Supp. 1987). 
15 VA. CODE ANN. § § 17.116.08, .09 (Cum. Supp. 1987). 
16 For example, in 1986, of 228 petitions filed for review to the Supreme 
Court of Virginia from the Court of Appeals, only three were granted.JUDICIAR Y 
REPORT, 1986, supra note I, at 30. 
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concerns for appellate capacity, filing trends, and appellate access formed the 
nexus around which the court was developed and initially implemented. 
The Court's Performance: A Statistical Analysis 
Within the context of high expectations and complex organizational and 
jurisdictional compromise, the court has completed over two and a half years of 
operation. A useable set of performance data is now available for examination. 
A statistical analysis of the appellate court systems of Virginia, Minnesota, 
South Carolina and Idaho, all of which added an intermediate appellate court after 
1980, can address the following performance areas: (I) the number of appeals/cases 
the courts disposed of as a percentage of the number of appeals/cases filed with 
the courts; (2) the trend, if any, of appeal/case filings and dispositions; (3) a 
comparative view of appellate performance including common transitional 
experiences; and (4) possible backlog and capacity issues as measures of policy 
fulfillment. 
Tables 1-4 show a year by year breakdown of key variables for the states 
that added intermediate appellate courts after 1980. Initially, the degree of 
comparability between the states varies. The footnotes in the tables indicate the 
relevant differences in counting procedures and other data composition caveats. 17 
In evaluating Virginia's experience, a two-fold approach must be taken. A 
discussion of the Virginia data in isolation provides the initial issue analysis; then-
a discussion of notable common occurrances is possible from which conclusions can 
be gleaned. 
The Transitional Experience 
Notably, the Tables 1-4 reveal several characteristic experiences. First, the 
initial year of operation for the lAC is marked by complications typical of shifting 
appellate caseloads and jurisdictions. The most obvious measure of such transition 
complications is seen in disposition rate fluctuations. 
Table I shows that, in 1985, the court of appeals disposed of 52% of the 
cases/appeals filed with the court. Importantly, appeals sought to the Supreme 
Court of Virginia from cases decided on or after October I, 1984 for which the 
court of appeals had jurisdiction, were docketed with the new IAC. 18 Thus, the 
intermediate appellate court started operation with a pending caseload. In 1986, the 
disposition rate for the lAC increased to 90% of filings. Interestingly, new filings 
were fairly constant, indicating the court was, in 1986, processing more cases in 
relation to its 1985 activity. 
Tables 2, 3 and 4 reinforce the observation of transitional disposition 
fluctuations. In their first year of operation, Minnesota, South Carolina and Idaho 
all experienced relatively low disposition rates when compared to filings. Also, the 
17 For example, instances of possible double counting are noted when cases 
are refiled with the appellate court and the case load cannot be broken down to 
separate them. 
18 JUDICIARY REPORT, 1984, supra note 12, at 45. 
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intermediate appellate courts of all the states increased their disposition rates in 
later years. For example, Idaho (Table 2), which added an lAC in 1982, shows a 
steady, significant increase in the disposition rate as a precentage of filings: 1982-
(32%); 1983-(67%); 1984-(120%); 1985-(190%); and 1986-(100%). 
The initial low disposition rates for all the sampled states indicate that 
transition for the court is a slow, incremental process. While this conclusion is not 
surprising, the common experience of all four states points to a longer evaluation 
period for judging a court's performance record with quantitative measures. With 
the Virginia lAC in its third year of operation, the court may still be in its 
operational learning curve. The other states' experiences should reveal that the 
task of implementing an lAC, even where otherwise clearly needed, is not an 
immediate panacea for appellate workload issues. 
Predictably, the lAC disposition rate fluctuation is reflected in the overall 
appellate disposition rate. The addition of the lAC puts a burden on the whole 
appellate system. The change, in terms of caseload filings and jurisdiction, might 
significantly reduce the processing ability of both courts in the short term. Again, 
the conclusion seems reasonable that the evaluation of the new appellate court 
system cannot be cast in terms of quick relief. The operation of the appellate 
system must be framed in a long term scheme that specifically accounts for 
transi tional com plica tions. 
Appellate Capacity 
Appellate capacity represents a second area of analysis appropriately 
addressed by the ta1Jles. The term ·capacity· is not used in the context of 
appellate processing limits. Rather, the capacity of an appellate court, in this 
article, is deemed a function of the volume inputed into a court and the resulting 
rate of output. As the 'absolute case load limit a court can ultimately process is not 
easily quantifiable, since a court can theoretically build a limitless pending 
caseload, the more useful measure is the trend of the rate of disposition in 
relation to filing patterns. By examining the movement of filing rates over time 
and the corresponding rates of disposition, the analysis builds on the previous 
discussion of the transitional data and seeks to identify any total 
workload/caseload experiences. 
An examination of Table 1 shows Virginia experienced a total appellate filing 
increase of 40% from 1984 to 1985. The large increase in appellate filings could 
indicate that the previous channels open to litigants after a trial decision were not 
adequate or that the new channels of appeal are significantly more accessible. The 
evaluation of whether the rapid increase in appellate filings from 1984,1985 is 
positive or negative rests with the determination of the merits of the additional 
appeals. 
While the evaluation of the merits of the incremental appeals is a qualitative 
analysis outside the scope of this work, several points are worth noting. First, the 
filings increase does not appear to continue from 1985 to 1986. The Virginia 
appellate court system experienced a modest 3% increase in appellate filings from 
1985 to 1986 (see Table 1). The difference in the filing rate increases may be a 
function of numerous variables, including the perception of a change in the 
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accessibility of the appellate court system. 19 This explanation suggests the initial 
large filings increase represents an adjustment process resulting from the appellate 
channels appearing more accessible to litigants. Thus, a pre-existing demand for 
the resources of the appellate court system combined with an increased perception 
of accessibility would be consistent with the significant first year filing increase 
seen in Table I. 
Also, filing patterns must be put in the context .of how the appellate system 
processes filings. Both the supreme court and the court of appeals have primarily 
discretionary jurisdiction. Thus, the majority of appellate filings do not necessarily 
translate into workload measures. This is important as the filing rate for the court 
may be a deceiving unit of count when focusing on appellate workload. 
Similar to Virginia's experience, Table 3 reveals total appellate filings in 
Minnesota increased dramatically in the years following the implementation of an 
intermediate appellate court (1983, 1984, and 1985). However, disposition rates were 
high before the addition of the lAC, indicating that increased capacity, not backlog 
(pending caseload), was the most visible effect of adding another appellate court. 
Conversely, for South Carolina and Idaho (Tables 4 and 2) the total caseload 
of the appellate court system did not dramatically increase after the lAC was 
added. Thus, in subsequent years, disposition rates as a percentage of filings 
usually increased for both courts in the appellate system. The increase in 
disposition rates, without an increase in filing rates, could indicate the opportunity 
to reduce any pending case load present before the lAC started operation. 
Tables 1-4 show two distinct appellate patterns at work. Table (Virginia) 
and Table 3 (Minnesota) appear to have experienced significant filing increases, at 
least for the year the lAC started operation. Tables 2 (Idaho) and 4 (South 
Carolina) indicate fairly comparable filing levels, but show high disposition rates. 
The implication of these differences surfaces as policymakers start to evaluate 
post-modification appellate court performance. The statistical difference between 
the two sets of states might be found in the operation of the appellate system 
prior to the addition of the lAC. However, this pre-implementation experience 
often rigidly dictates the subsequent evaluation process to the point of precluding 
any subsequent, but unarticulated, operational benefits. 
An;Evaluation 
Ultimately, in the context of judicial management, how well the justification 
for adding the lAC matches the post-implementation experience will determine the 
initial label of "solution" or "symptom" attached to the court. The foregoing 
analysis reveals that if Virginia and, to a lesser extent, Minnesota were 
anticipating an opportunity to quickly reduce the pending caseload, the addition of 
the lAC probably did not meet expectations. Alternatively, if Idaho and South 
19 See McAuliffe, Virginia Tort Reform: A Case of Crying Wolf! 16 COL. 
LA W. 4, 12 (Spring 1987), where the proposition is made that the perception of an 
increase in trial case filings and recoveries may be a causal factor in the assertion 
of a litigation "crisis". Appellate filings may be subject to the same process; see 
also Roper, The Propensity to Litigate in State Trial Courts. 1981-1984, 1984-1985 
11 JUST. SYS. J. 262, 267 (1987). 
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Carolina thought appellate capacity was the pressing need basis for adding another 
appellate court, their prediction may have been less than accurate. 
However, in Virginia's case, a need to open the appellate channels, at least· to 
the degree of not creating potentially unresponsive institutional barriers (e.g., one 
appellate court with primarily discretionary jurisdiction) seems to have been 
addressed. If the observation is accurate that the first year increase in filings 
points to an adjustment process, the tiered appellate court system may be 
appropriately responding to a demand for some minimal aPllellate review for more 
cases. 
Also, if the transitional analysis approximates a real world process, low initial 
disposition rates should not be viewed as a measure of ineffectiveness. The 
complications of adding an lAC seem to be a part of the appellate modification 
process and should diminish over time. The Court of Appeals of Virginia and the 
other sample states' intermediate appellate courts should be evaluated with longer 
time frames than previously thought appropriate and viewed in terms of addressing 
changing needs. 
Finally, even if the "perceived" need for adding a court does not appear to 
have been met, the tiered appellate court system may well be the appropriate 
answer to other important policy concerns not adequately developed in the pre-
implementation legislative debate. For example, the need for increased appellate 
access may have been the accurate justification for adding an lAC in Virginia, but 
the focus of the initial debate, for some, was the issue of reducing the pending· 
caseload. 
A quantitative review of the court of appeals' (indeed the whole appellate 
court system's) operation enables policymakers to monitor the new mechanism for 
processing appeals. A two and one- half year snapshot of Virginia's' appellate 
court system leads to the conclusion that the Commonwealth needed additional 
doors through which appellate review could be sought. The structure of the court 
of appeals, its primary use of discretionary jurisdiction and the oversight process 
are all mechanisms designed to enable the court to open and shut the door as the 
merits of the appeal dictate; nothing, quantitatively, is present to dispute the 
conclusion that those mechanisms are indeed working properly. 
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Table 1 
Appellate FIling/Disposition 
Data for Jurisdictions that 
Added an Intermediate 
Appellate Court After 1980 
1980-1986 
VIRGINIA 
SUDremLCourt Court of ApDeal s 
Mandatory Discretionary Mal t1allita.t.Q.Q tli.screti onary lilia.l 
1980: 
F11ed ......................... . 
Disposed ...................•..• 
Dispositions as a percentage 
of fillngs .................. . 
1981 : 
Filed ....................•..•.. 
01 sposed ...................••.. 
Oi spos it Ions as a percentage 
of fillngs .................. . 
1982 : 
Filed ......................... . 
Oi sposed .......••.............. 
Dispositions as a percentage 
of f11lngs ...•••.....•...•... 
1983 : 
Flied ..................•...•... 
Disposed •............•....••••• 
01 spos it Ions as a percentage 
of f111ngs ..•...........••... 
1984 : 
Filed ...•....••.....•.......... 
Disposed ........••...•••....... 
01spostt tons as a percentage 
of fi llngs .......•........... 
"1985 : 
Fil ed ..•...•....•........•..... 
01 sposed ....••••••...........•. 
Dispositions as a percentage 
of filings •••.••.•........... 
1986: 
FI led ......•••••••••......•.... 
Di sposed ....••••••.•........... 
Disposlt\ons as a percentage 
of fillngs ..••...•....•...... 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
year Intermediate Appellate Court started. 
not appllcable. 
N/A data not available. 
Footnotes: 
2,091 
1,860 
89% 
2,257 
1,823 
81% 
2,290 
2,318 
101% 
2,073 
1,922 
93% 
1,915 
1,919 
100% 
1,043 
1,321 
127% 
1,232 
1,095 
89% 
2,091' 
1,860 ' 
89%' 
2,257' 
1, 823' 
81%' 
2,290 ' 
2,318' 
101%' 
2,073' 
1,922' 
93%1 
1,9 IS' 
1,919' 
100%' 
1,043 
1,321 
127% 
1,232 
1,095 
89% 
538 
216 
40% 
423 
476 
113% 
1,103 
637 
58% 
1,113 
908 
82% 
1,641 
853 
52% 
1,536 
1,384 
90% 
State Total s 
2,091' 
1,860 ' 
89%' 
2,257' 
1,823 1 
81%' 
2,290 ' 
2,318' 
101%' 
2,073' 
1.922 1 
93%' 
1,915' 
1,919' 
100%' 
2,684' 
2,174' 
8U;' 
2,768' 
2,479' 
90%' 
'Totals are Incomplete but comparable. Data do not include appeals of right such as appeals from the State Corporation 
Conmisslon and cases Involving the death penalty. 
Source: State Judicial Annual Reports, 1980-1986. 
00 
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Table 2 
Appellate Filing/Disposition 
Data for Jurisd1cttons that Added an 
lntermedtate Appellate Court After 1980 
19BO-1986 
IDAHO 
S~II;!(cme Ccuct eDuct gf AIH2CD 1 S 
~ Discretionary IgUl ~ Discretionary 
1960: 
Ft led NfA 
D, sposed ...................... . NfA 
OisposHtons as a percentage 
of filings .................. . NfA 
1981 : 
ft led ..............•..•...•••.. NfA 
Dt sposed ...................... . NfA 
o i spos 1 t \ ons as a percentage 
of filingS ..........•.......• NfA 
'1982 : 
Fi led ...•••........••......••.. UfA 
Disposed ...................... . NfA 
Dispositions as a percentage 
of filings .................. . NfA 
1983 : 
Fi led ......................... . 319 
Disposed ...................... . 310 
Oispositions as a percentage 
of f11 ,ngs ................. .. 116% 
1984 : 
~~!:~S~d':::::::::::::::::::::::' . 349 J 352' 
DlsposiUons as a percentage 
of filings .................. . 101%' 
1985 : 
Fi led '" 348 J 
Dlsposed .................... . 311 J 
DispOS1tions as a percentage 
of filings ............•.....• 96%' 
1986: 
Fi led ..... . ......... . 28B 
Disposed ...................... . 359 
Dispositions as a percentage 
of filings .................. . 125X 
year Intermediate Appellate Court started. 
not app1 icable. 
NJ no jurisdictloo. 
N/A data not available. 
Footnotes: 
NfA 43B 
NfA 316 
NfA B6X 
UfA 435 1 
NfA 363' 
NfA 83X' 
UfA Z33' 31B UJ 
NfA Z53 J 101 NJ 
NfA 109%' 32% NJ 
49 36B 16S I NJ 
80 450 111 , NJ 
163% 122X 67% NJ 
60 409 l 146 NJ 
55 401' 115 NJ 
92% 100%' 120% NJ 
92' 440 D 149 NJ 
99' 432° 282 NJ 
108%1 98%" 190% NJ 
77 365 174 NJ 
11 430 114 NJ 
92X 118X 100% NJ 
IgUl State Totals 
43B 
316 
B6X 
435 I 
363 I 
83%' 
31B 551' 
101 354 J 
32:1: 64:1:' 
165 533 
111 61S 
67% 115% 
146 555' 
\15 582' 
120% 105%' 
149 5890 
282 714 D 
190X 121%" 
114 539 
114 604 
100:1: 112X 
°1985 figure represents some double counting. Discretionary pettt\ons granted review are counted once as a petHion and 
again when they are reftled as mandatory cases. 
110 1984, no data were avai table on the number of requests to appeal. 
J19B,. '985 data includes some discretionary cases reviewed on the merits. Also. 1982 data includes all case types. 
but are comparable. 
Source: Slate Jud\cial Annual Reports, 1980-1906. 
." 
o 
Table 3 
Appellate Filing/Disposition 
Data for Jurisdictions that 
Added an Intermediate 
Appellate Court After 1980 
1980-1986 
MINNESOTA 
SUDreme Court ______ ~C2V~I-A~~p~ea~ILs~ ______ _ 
Mandatory 0' screti onary !oW 
1980 : 
Filed ............•............. 
Disposed ..•...•.•....•........• 
Dispositions as a percentage 
of filings ...•..•............ 
1981 : 
Filed ......••.................. 
01 sposed ...................... . 
Dispositions as a percentage 
of filings ...•............... 
1982: 
Fi led ......................... . 
01 sposed ..................•.... 
Dispositions as a percentage 
of filings .................. . 
'1983 : 
fll ed ............•.......•..... 
01 sposed ..•................••.. 
Dispositions as a percentage 
of 'ft lings ......•........•... 
1984 : 
Filed ..........••..•........... 
Disposed .....•................. 
Dispositions as a percentage 
of filings ..•................ 
1985: 
FIl ed ......................... . 
Disposed ......................• 
DIspositions as a percentage 
of ft lings ..........•........ 
1986: 
filed ......................... . 
01 sposed ...................... . 
Dispositions as a percentage 
of filings .................. . 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
1,311 
1,360 
104% 
216 
938 
434% 
211 
329 
156% 
176 
159 
90% 
year Intermediate Appellate Court started. 
not applicable. 
N/A data not available. 
Footnotes: 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
6 
3 
50% 
361 
151 
42% 
575 
626 
109% 
595 
624 
105% 
'1981 data do not Include administrative agency appeals. 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
1, 391' 
1,356' 
98%' 
1,682 
1,592 
95% 
1,3 I 7 
1,363 
104% 
577 
1,089 
189% 
786 
955 
122% 
771 
783 
102% 
!:1l!!l!!lloa Discretjon~ I!!lll 
663 
105 
16% 
1,918 
1,722 
90% 
2,089 
2,061 
99% 
1,965 
1,998 
102% 
18 
12 
67% 
118 
III 
94% 
80 
84 
105% 
90 
84 
93% 
681 
117 
17% 
2,036 
1,833 
90% 
2,169 
2,145 
99% 
2,055 
2,082 
101% 
Source: State Appellate Statistical Profiles, National Center for State Courts. 
£.tate Total s 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
1,391' 
1,356' 
98%' 
1,682 
1,592 
95% 
1,998 
1,480 
74% 
2,613 
2,922 
112% 
2,955 
3,100 
105% 
2,826 
2,865 
101% 
'" 
Table 4 
Appellate f'tl1ng/DtsposHion 
Data for Jur'lsd\ct 1005 that 
Added an Intermedt ate 
Appellate Court After 1980 
1980-1986 
SOUTH CAROLINA 
SU!;Ircme CauCl. Court gf AIUiu:a]:i 
tIaildlllIa Discretionarx Ililll IIa!llIWla DiscretignAry 
1980 : 
fi led ......................... . 
D;sposed ...................... . 
0\ spas \ t; ons as a percentage 
of fil'tngs .................. . 
1981 : 
Fi led ......................... . 
Disposed ... ................... . 
0; spas it; ons as a percentage 
of filings .................. . 
196Z: 
Fl1ed ......................... . 
Disposed ...................... . 
OisposHions as a percentage 
of f; hUgs ..... 
'1963: 
Flled ................... . 
Disposed ...................... . 
Oispositions as a percentage 
of filings ... ,' .............. . 
1964 : 
F\ led ......................... . 
Disposed ...................... . 
Dlspos1tions as a percentage 
of filings .................. . 
1985; 
Filed ....................... . 
Dhposed ....... . 
Oispositions as a percentage 
of filings .............. . 
1986: 
Fi led ......................... . 
Disposed ...................... . 
D i spas i t 1 ons as a percentage 
of f111og5 ........... . 
N/A N/A 921 
NO N/A N/A 
N/A N/A N/A 
NIA N/A I ,03~ 
N/A N/A 810 
N/A N/A 78% 
N/A N/A 971 
N/A N/A 614 
NIA N/A 63~ 
NIA N/A 900 
N/A N/A 499 
NIA NIA ~" 
479 NIA 492/ 
N/A N/A 441' 
N/A N/A 90~1 
4~1 N/A 475' 
H/A N/A 556' 
N/A N/A llnl 
N/A N/A H/A 
N/A N/A N/A 
N/A N/A N/A 
tTransfers from the Supreme Court. Transfers not included \n state total. 
:= year Intermediate Appellate Court started (September 1. 1983). 
:: not appltcable. 
NJ no juriSdiction. 
N/A : data not ava; lable. 
Footnotes: 
--I 
30 NJ 
26 NJ 
87% NJ 
404 NJ 
441 HJ 
109'l; HJ 
391 HJ 
398 NJ 
102\ NJ 
N/A HJ 
H/A NJ 
NIA NJ 
'1984 and 1985 totals do not include discretionary petittons that were dented review or otherwise 
d ism; sscd/w I thdraw/sett 1 cd. 
Source: State Jud,clal Annual Reports I 1980-1985. 
IOlll State Totals 
921 
N/A 
N/A 
1,035 
610 
78% 
971 
614 
63% 
(270t' 30 930 
(34., 26 ~25 
(13%.) 8n ~7X 
404 896' 
441 884' 
109% 99%' 
391 866' 
398 954' 
117% 110%' 
H/A N/A 
N/A N/A 
N/A H/A 
THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE: 
FRIEND OR FOE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT? 
by 
E. Diana Hamner 
Felicia L. Silber 
Introduction 
On August 4, 1987, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) abandoned 
the controversial Fairness Doctrine l because the doctrine "violated the First 
Amendment rights of broadcasters and, therefore, was no longer in the public 
in terest."2 The Fairness Doctrine imposed on broadcasters two interrelated 
obligations in return for the privilege, granted by the government, to use a portion 
of the broadcasting spectrum. The Fairness Doctrine required licensees (I) "to 
provide 'coverage of vitally important controversial issues of interest in the 
community served by the licensees"3 and (2) "to provide a reasonable opportunity 
for the presentation of contrasting viewpoints· on such issues."4 The decision to 
eliminate the Fairness Doctrine is not much of a surprise in view of the Reagan 
era of governmental deregulation. This FCC decision closely followed a June 19, 
1987, Presidential veto of the Fairness in Broadcasting Act of 1987,5 a bill which 
would have codified the Fairness Doctrine.6 
The public should note that the disappearance of the Fairness Doctrine does 
not signal total deregulation of the broadcasting content. In its August 1987 
decision, the FCC specifically acknowledged that the ruling against the Fairness 
Doctrine did not apply to "equal access"7 and "equal time"8 requirements imposed 
I For an explanation of the "Fairness Doctrine", see infra notes 3 & 4 and 
accompanying text. 
2 Syracuse Peace Council v. Television Station WTVH, 52 F.R. 31768 (1987). 
3 Report Concerning General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast 
Licensees, 102 FCC2d 143, 146 (1985) [hereinafter 1985 Fairness Report]. 
4 [d. 
5 S. 742, IOOth Con g., 1st Sess. § 3 (1987). 
6 Message to the Senate Returning S. 742 Without Approval, 23 WEEKLY 
COMPo PRES. DOC. 715 (June 19, 1987). 
7 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7)(l982) (gives the FCC the authority to revoke a 
broadcast license for willful or repeated failure to allow "reasonable access to or 
to permit purchase of reasona\:tle amounts of time for the use of a broadcast 
station by a candidate for federal elective office on behalf of his candidacy"). 
8 47 U.S.c. § 315 (1981) (commonly referred to as the "equal time" provision). 
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by the Communications Act.9 Thus, a broadcaster allowing a qualified candidate 
for public office to "use" its airwaves must continue to afford equal opportunities 
to all other opposing candida tes. 1 0 
Remand forced the Decision 
The FCC's action to invalidate the Fairness Doctrine carne in response to a 
January 1987, remand order of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia. 1 I The FCC found' that 'the Meredith Corporation's (Meredith) television 
station WTYH of Syrac'use, New York, violated the Fairness Doctrine. In review of 
the FCC's finding of a violation, the court held that although the FCC reasonably 
interpreted its own Fairness Doctrine precedents, it failed to give adequate 
consideration to Meredith's constitutional argument. 12 The court evaded 
constitutional review of whether the application of the Fairness Doctrine to 
Meredith violated the first amendment. Instead, the court gave the question back 
to the FCC because "in a formal adjudication, an administrative agency is obliged 
to consider and respond to substantial arguments a respondent presents in its 
defense."13 In its 1985 Fairness Report, the FCC "deliberately cast grave legal 
doubt on the Fairness Doctrine",14 so the time was ripe for the FCC to strike 
down the Doctrine. 
Development of the Fairness Doctrine 
The Fag.ness Doctrine "originated very early in the history of 
broadcasti~g ... ." 15 'The origins of the Fairness Doctrine are usually traced to a 
1929 decision of the FCC's predecessor, the Federal Radio Commission. 16 In 1949, 
the FCC issued the Report on Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees,17 stating the 
doctrine in its present two-prong form. 18 
In 1959, Congress amended Section 315 of the Communications Act 19 so that 
appearances by political candidates on news broadcasts could be exempted from the 
9 Syracuse Peace Council v. Television Station WTYH, 52 F. R. 31768. The 
decision also does nothing to limit the FCC's ability to license stations and 
regulate them in the public interest. ld. 
10 47 U.S.c. § 315 (1981). 
11 Meredith Corp. v. FCC, 809 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
12 [d. at 865. 
13 [d. at 873 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 557(c)(1982». 
14 Id. 
15 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,369 (1969). 
16 See Great Lakes Broadcasting, 3 FRC Ann. Rep. 32 (1929), ·rev'd on other 
grounds, 37 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 706 (1930). 
17 13 FCC 1246 (1949) [hereinafter Report on Editorializing]. 
18 See infra text accompanying notes 3 & 4. 
19 47 U.S.c. § 315(a) (1981). 
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"equal time" rule. The amendment also included this language: "nothing [in this 
section] shall be construed as relieving broadcasters, ... , from the obligation imposed 
upon them under this Act to operate in the public interest and to afford 
reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views on issues of public 
importance.,,20 
Whether this amendment codified the Fairness Doctrine such that the FCC 
could not modify or eliminate the doctrine without approval from Congress is a 
matter of debate.21 The Supreme Court stated that the 1959 amendment "ratified" 
the Fairness Doctrine.22 The D.C. Circuit in Meredith also sidestepped the issue. 
The court pointed out that 
the Commission [in its 1985 Fairness Report] refused to decide whether 
the Fairness Doctrine was self-generated pursuant to its general 
congressional authorization or specifically mandated by Congress .... We 
think, however, the Commission was obliged to resolve that issue, at 
least in the context of an enforcement proceeding in which a party 
raises a constitutional defense.23 
The fact that the FCC ruled on August 4, 1987, that the Fairness Doctrine violated 
the first amendment rights of broadcasters indicates that perhaps the 
Communications Act does not codify Fairness Doctrine. 
codification issue remains elusive. 
The answer to the 
The Supreme Court unanimously upheld the Fairness Doctrine in Red Lion 
Broadcasting v. FCC.24 The Court held that "[i]t is the right of the viewers and 
listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount."25 The Court 
justified its conclusion in light of the limited availability of broadcast frequencies, 
reasoning that the Fairness Doctrine's restrictions on broadcasters' freedom of 
speech were permissible because the first amendment right to be informed is 
crucial.26 The Court in Red Lion left open the door for future challenges, noting 
that "if experience with the administration of these doctrines indicates that they 
have the net effect of reducing rather than enhancing the volume and quality of 
coverage, there will be time enough to reconsider constitutional implications."27 
Although the Supreme Court upheld the Fairness Doctrine in Red Lion on the 
basis of scarcity of broadcast frequencies, it has declined to apply the Fairness 
Doctrine to newspaper publishing.28 In Miami Herald, the Court struck down 
Florida's "right of reply" statute granting a political candidate a right to equal 
20 1d. 
21 Krattenmaker & Powe, The Fairness Doctrine Today: A Constitutional 
Curiosity and an Impossible Dream, 1985 DUKE L.J. 151, 153 n. 14 (1985). 
22 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 382 (1969). 
23 Meredith Corp. v. FCC, 809 F.2d 863, 873 (D.C.Cir. 1987). 
24 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
25 Id. at 389. 
26 Id. at 389-390. 
27 Id. at 393. 
28 Miami Herald v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). 
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space to answer criticism and attacks on his record by a newspaper, free of 
charge. The Court ignored the argument that "[tlhe First Amendment interest of 
the public in being informed is said to be in peril because the 'marketplace of 
ideas' is today a monopoly controlled by owners of the market"29 and concluded 
that 
[tlhe choice of materials to go into a newspaper, and the decisions 
made as to limitations on the size and content of the paper, and 
treatment of public officials-whether fair or unfair-constitute the 
exercise of editorial control and judgment. It has yet to be 
demonstrated how governmental regulation of this crucial process can 
be exercised consistent with First Amendment guarantees of a free 
press as they have evolved to this time.30 
In CBS v. Democratic National Committee,31 the Supreme Court held that 
neither the Communications Act nor the first amendment requires broadcasters to 
accept paid editorial advertisements. In that opinion, Justice White pointed out 
that "[ulnlike other media, broadcasting is subject to an inherent physical 
limitation .... Because the broadcast media utilize a valuable and limited public 
resource, there is also present an unusual order of First Amendment values.,,32 
The Supreme Court again affirmed the Fairness Doctrine but noted that "the 
broadcast industry is dynamic in terms of technological change; solutions adequate 
a decade ago are not necessarily so now, and those acceptable today may well be 
outmoded ten years hence."33 Again the Court left some flexibility in the area of 
broadcast regulations, tying substance of regulations to technological change. 
More recently, in FCC v. League 0/ Women Voters 0/ Cali/ornia,34 the Court 
declined to reconsider Red Lion ·without some signal from Congress or the FCC 
that technological developments have advanced so far that some revision of the 
system of broadcast regulation may be required."35 The FCC's 1985 Fairness 
Report certainly endeavored to send the Supreme Court the signal invited in 
League 0/ Women Voters. 36 Because of the explosive growth of information 
sources, the 1985 Fairness Report found the "scarcity rationale," which has 
historically justified content regulation of broadcasting, no longer valid.37 The 
FCC concluded that "[wlere the balance ours alone to strike, the Fairness Doctrine 
would ... fall short of promoting those interests necessary to uphold its 
29 [d. at 251. 
30 [d. at 258. 
31 412 U.S. 94 (1973). 
32 [d. at 101. 
33 [d. at 102. The Supreme Court also reaffirmed Red Lion in CBS v. FCC, 
453 U.S. 367, 395 (1981) (holding that § 312(a)(7) of the Communications Act 
creates a limited right to "reasonable" access that pertains only to legally qualified 
federal candidates and may be invoked by them only for the purpose of advancing 
their candidacies once a campaign has commenced.) 
34 468 U.S. 364 (1984). 
35 [d. at 376-377 n.11. 
36 Meredith Corp. v. FCC, 809 F.2d at 867. 
37 [d. at 867. 
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Factors Weighing on the Constitutional Balance 
In analyzing the legal and philosophical shift in perception of first amendment 
rights involved in broadcasting, the climate of deregulation in the Reagan 
administration, assumptions concerning modern broadcasting technology, and the 
text of the Doctrine itself must be considered. Often, as with the Fairness 
Doctrine issue, overruling a legal principle on the grounds that it is contrary to 
public interest after longstanding, explicit acceptance reflects a pragmatic 
realization on the part of the Court that a particular policy may be unworkable or 
undesirable on extra-constitutional grounds. 
Regulatory Environment 
A trend toward deregulation marks the Reagan era. According to its 
proponents, deregulation sweeps away anachronistic, harmful restrictions that 
interfere with the ebb and flow of markets. In the context of businesses providing 
information to the public, the requirement of fair presentation of important issues 
was judged, in Syracuse Peace Council, to promote "excessive and unnecessary 
government intervention into the editorial processes of broadcast journalists."39 
"Excessive intervention" was defined by the standard set in F.C.C. v. League 
0/ Women Voters;40 the Court ruled that regulation of broadcasters' speech must 
be "narrowly tailored to achieve a substantial government interest."41 The 
"substantial government interest" test as applied in Syracuse Peace Council suggests 
that "government interest" will now be closely associated with legitimizing the 
broadcasters' privileges as rights, rather than defending the public's desire to be 
heard and to remain informed. 
However, regulation of the broadcast industry, despite all its attendant 
burdens and costs, may be justifiable because of the especially sensitive effect the 
presentation of news has on the process of democracy, and the important first 
amendment values embodied in the Doctrine which override pragmatic concerns 
about "excessive intervention" and economic efficiency. 
Modern Broadcast Technology 
Opponents of the overturned Doctrine suggest that even if the goal of 
protecting the public's right to information has merit in the abstract, government 
involvement has become superfluous in light of current technology, as was argued 
in the 1985 Fairness Report. With the increasing penetration of cable television in 
its one hundred channel capacity, the possibility for all opinions to be aired is 
effectively limitless. However, cable serves fewer than 50% of all U.S. 
38 1985 Fairness Report, 102 FCC 2d 143, 156 (1985). 
39 Syracuse Peace Council v. Television Station WTVH, 52 F.R. 31768 (1987). 
40 468 U.S. 364 (1984). 
41 [d. at 380. 
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households.42 Furthermore, cable requires additional payment over and above the 
indirect costs of advertising borne by the consumers of over-the-air stations, 
which further restricts its potential availability to the general public. 
With only one topic featured on many of the cable channels, programming can 
now be easily directed to a particularly desired audience. This audience 
fragmentation serves to frustrate the public interest in obtaining a common ground 
to discuss issues of importance to all kinds of viewers. Devotees of serious news 
have several channels catering to them, but the limited availability and extra cost 
arguments minimize these outlets as the solution to the public's need for a balance 
of biases in the portrayal of issues. 
The meaning of an "overall balance" in the presentation of controversial 
issues has shifted over time from the ideal of balance within each station's 
programming to a more general notion of balance in all media taken together. In 
the Miami Herald case, the Court refused to regulate for a balanced approach of 
all media taken together, citing editorial discretion as the important value to be 
promulgated, regardless of the impact on the type of information publicly available. 
Although viewers and listeners may theoretically have the option of pleading their 
views on a plethora of stations, and in print as well as over the air, the number 
of stations that will actively seek or welcome material associated with 
controversial issues will only decline in the aftermath of the elimination of the 
Fairness Doctrine. 
One leading economic rationale justifies government interference on the 
grounds that competition in the marketplace has failed to provide a necessary or 
desirable social good. Broadcasters, especially when the issue is the media itself, as 
a whole have an incentive for preventing the airing of certain viewpoints and 
issues in their entirety, thus removing a valuable social good. If broadcasters 
present a monolithic front and universally declare the issue unimportant or not 
controversial enough to warrant broadcast time, the technologically-increased 
number of stations theoretically available to the public makes no diffe·rence.43 
While technology might have changed ·since the Red Lion decision, the greater 
number of media outlets may have merely amplified the strength of the media in 
resisting its duties rather than providing more of the public an opportunity to gain 
a hearing. 
Efficacy of Enforcement In Light of the Text 
The text of the Fairness Doctrine posed a large part of the difficulty in 
effectively guaranteeing a first amendment atmosphere to the public. Because its 
provisions were so broad, and thus open to widely differing interpretation, the 
Doctrine was consistently attacked in its application as an arbitrary vehicle for 
enforcement, useful only in situations of flagrant and chronic violations on major 
channels. The Syracuse Peace Council decision illustrates the difficulty the FCC 
had in enforcing the Doctrine in a fair and predictable manner. The FCC simply 
does not have the resources available to pursue every possible infraction with the 
42 Ferris & Kirkland, Fairness-The Broadcaster's Hippocratic Oath, 34 CA TH. 
U.L. REV. 605 (1985) [hereinafter Hippocratic Oath]. 
43 See supra notes 28 & 29 and accompanying text. 
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same degree of intensity. The vagueness of the first provision of the Doctrine, 
the "reasonable percentage of time" obligation, could be seen as promoting a 
general positive value for society, rather than a strict guideline with corresponding 
penalties for violation. 
General industry criticism of the low percentage of Fairness complaints 
affirmed by the FCC cites inadequacy of resources as the reason behind agency 
ineffecti.veness in carrying out its Fairness goals. Often, the FCC could only truly 
oversee the major television networks and radio stations in large cities, and 
broadcasters in smaller communities escaped their obligations since violations were 
less likely to attract the attention of an national organization like the FCC. This 
limited enforcement reveals Fairness complaints as vehicles for vocal minorities to 
pursue their private agendas and impose their views on the public. 
The efficacy-of -enforcement question has narrowed the first amendment by 
limiting affirmative, as well as defensive, actions in support of free speech. If 
broadcasters fail to present a controversial issue for comment, the supporters of 
the Doctrine feel that the community as a whole is harmed. But this harm is more 
difficult to prove than in a case where a group or an individual is prohibited from 
speaking out. The criteria used to define a controversial issue for Fairness 
Doctrine purposes are always susceptible to attack as reflecting biases of 
regulators or broadcasters. Broadcasters know that once a controversial issue is put 
forward and the "balance" obligation is triggered, the record of the station in 
presenting both sides is not difficult to check, as in the case of a "defensive" first 
amendment claim. Although the Doctrine does not require "equal time" be given to 
both sides, "overall balance" of programming remains a matter of public record in 
station logs, allowing obviously inequitable presentations to be easily discovered, if 
indeed the FCC is equipped to monitor them. 
By no means has the federal government relinquished control over the content 
of the airwaves. Because the Syracuse Peace Council did not overturn the "equal 
time", "equal access" and licensing requirements for political candidates, 
government retains the ability to prevent media manipulation of vital facts. The 
FCC's opinion signals in part a concession to the current atmosphere of 
deregulation, but mainly reflects a concern with breadth of the Doctrine's actual 
text. Regardless of how worthy its purpose, a regulation cannot function as law 
without reliable and cost-effective means for enforcement. 
Conclusion 
If the text of the Doctrine was insufficient to safeguard the public's right to 
be informed and to inform, a choice must be made between promoting these goals 
through education and interest group action, or by government regulation. Action 
in the remainder of the decade will be slow due to the pervasive atmosphere of 
deregulation, but perhaps a "fairer" doctrine could be developed which would 
recognize the essential nature of information flowing to the public without entirely 
defeating the interests of broadcasters in remaining autonomous 
In the absence of new regulations, the standard requiring stations to devote a 
reasonable amount of time to controversial issues should be promoted by the 
stations as an industry ethic to accomplish fair representation of opposing views. 
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Likewise, the now-defunct "controversial" requirement ought to force stations to 
air timely issues at regular intervals, with formal opportunities for public input. 
The philosophy behind the Fairness Doctrine is applauded by all, with the 
understandable exception of some station owners. Broadcasters clearly owe duties 
to the public in return for their licenses. However, delineating these duties 
without hamstringing television and radio stations in the daily conduct of their 
business requires more definitive statements of policy than those contained in the 
version of the Fairness Doctrine overturned in August. Finding an appropriate way 
to articulate our shared concerns for first amendment protections in the 
broadcasting industry is the task facing the public, the industry, and government 
alike. 
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RECOVER Y FOR ASBESTOS ABATEMENT PROGRAMS: 
A THEORY OF RECOVERY FOR MUNICIPALITIES 
by 
James T. Vitelli 
Knowledge of the severe health risks posed by exposure to asbestos is 
creating a variety of new legal challenges, some of which have yet to be 
conclusively litigated. Courts and commentators have given their attention to the 
liability of asbestos manufacturers for exposing workers to harmful products. This 
article will focus on a different form of litigation: recovery by a municipality 
against a manufacturer for expenditures made to abate the health risks generated 
by asbestos used in the construction of municipal buildings. 
Recovery of this sort requires an altogether different theory of liability 
because no personal injury is alleged. As most of the health concerns with respect 
to asbestos in municipal buildings stem from exposure to the material by children 
in public schools, this paper concentrates its analysis on abatement procedures and 
recovery as they relate to the municipality's school system, although the theory of 
recovery applies with equal strength to public libraries, city halls, and other public 
buildings. For the purposes of analysis, we will assume that the municipality 
referred to in this article is located in a jurisdiction that has adopted the Uniform 
Commercial Code and section 402A of the Restatement 2d, Torts. 
BACKGROUND 
From the mid-1940's to the mid-1970's contractors used asbestos-containing 
materials (ACM) in school buildings for fireproofing and insulation) Becasue of 
its industrially advantageous qualities2, asbestos was widely used in cement 
products, plaster, fireproof textiles, vinyl floor tiles, thermal and acoustical 
insulation and sprayed materials.3 The hard asbestos-containing materials such as 
vinyl floors are generally safe and produce few, if any exposure problems. 
However, soft or loosely bound materials, known as friable asbestos, pose serious 
risks of contamination and exposure-related health problems.4 Friable materials 
crumble and fray easily, releasing asbestos dust and fibers into the air from which 
they can be inhaled and trapped in the respiratory system. 
Asbestos Related Health Risks 
I Lang, The Problem oj Asbestos in the Public Schools, 16 
Q. 13 (No.2 1984) [hereinafter Asbestos in Public Schools]. 
TRIAL LAW. 
2 Jd. These qualities include fire resistance, tensile strength, and above 
average thermal and electrical insulating capabilities. 
3 Jd. 
4 Office of Toxic Substances, U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Guidance Jor 
Controlling Friable Asbestos-Containing Materials in Buildings 2-1 (1983) 
[hereinafter Friable Asbestos], as cited in Lang, Asbestos in Public Schools at 13 n.5. 
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Among the serious medical disorders ·associated with exposure to asbestos are: 
asbestosis, a lung disease; mesothelioma, a rare cancer of the chest and abdominal 
lining; and cancers of the lung, esophagus, stomach, colon and other organs.5 
School age children face particularly severe problems because of the diseases' long-
term manifestation period.6 The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) estimates 
that a child exposed to asbestos between the ages of five and ten has at least ten 
times greater chance of contracting mesothelioma than does an adult between the 
ages of thirty-five and forty.1 In addition to these findings by the EPA, Congress 
. released its own conclusions regarding the health risks presented to school children 
exposed to asbestos products. Section 4011 of the Asbestos School Hazard 
Abatement Act of 1984,8 now incorporated into Title 20, reads in part: 
(a) The Congress finds that --
(I) exposure to asbestos fibers has been identified over long period of 
time by reputable medical and scientific evidence as significantly 
increasing the incidence of cancer and other severe fatal diseases, such 
as asbestosis; 
(2) medical evidence has suggested that children may be particularly 
vulnerable to environmentally induced cancers; ... 
(4) substantial amounts of asbestos, particularly in sprayed form, have 
been used in school buildings, especially during the period 1946 through 
1972; 
(5) partial surveys in some States have indicated that (A) in a number 
of school buildings materials containing asbestos fibers became damaged 
or friable, causing asbestos fibers to be dislodged into the air, and (B) 
asbestos concentration 
far exceeding normal ambient air levels have been found in school 
buildings containing such damaged materials; 
(6) the presence in school buildings of friable or easily damaged 
asbestos creates an unwarranted hazard to the health of school children 
and school employees who are exposed to such material .... 9 
In addition to agency and congressional recognition of the health hazards 
created by exposure to asbestos, courts have also acknowledged the dangers. A 
federal district court in Minnesota held, when presented with the issue of whether 
a plaintiff could collaterally estop the defendant from litigating the issue of 
5 Id. at 14. See also G. PETERS & B. PETERS, SOURCEBOOK ON 
ASBESTOS DISEASES: MEDICAL, LEGAL, AND ENGINEERING ASPECTS, at BI-BII 
(I980) as cited in Kincade, Issues in School Asbestos Hazard Abatement Litigation, 
16 ST. MARY'S L.J. 951, 954 n.1I (1985). 
6 See Lang, Asbestos in Public Schools, at 14, "As contrasted with asbestos 
workers, school age children have a significantly greater lifetime 'risk in developing 
mesothelioma because of the age at which asbestos exposure occurs." Id. at 14 n.I3. 
7 The 1983 EPA Study (Friable Asbestos) at 1-2, as cited in Lang, Asbestos 
in Public Schools at 14 n.15. 
8 20 U.S.C.A. § 4011-4021 (West Supp. 1987). 
9 20 U.S.C.A. § 4011 (West Supp. 1987), (emphasis added). 
t02 
disease causation, that the fact that asbestos causes diseases such as asbestosis 
and mesothelioma was so firmly entrenched in medical and legal literature that it 
was not subject to serious dispute. IO This universal recognition of the health 
hazards presented by asbestos products to school children and teachers has caused 
federal and state agencies to develop mandatory asbestos abatement procedures. 
The Process of Asbestos Abatement 
In May, 1982, the EPA promulgated a rule requiring "local education agencies 
to identify friable asbestos-containing material in public and private schools by 
visually inspecting. schools buildings for friable materials ... .'oIl This rule also 
requires "local education agencies to provide warnings of the health effects of 
asbestos and instructions on methods to avoid or reduce exposure to school 
employees of any school with friable asbestos-containing material and to notify 
parent-teacher associations of the results of inspections."12 Though the rule 
requires detection and warning, the EPA did not require abatement or offer any 
guidelines if this course of action was pursued. 13 As a result, school districts 
have taken it upon themselves to abate the hazardous materials. In addition to 
voluntary abatement, some states have implemented mandatory abatement 
procedures upon the discovery of ACM 14 The procedures often include: 
I) total removal, the most costly yet most permanent remedy; 
2) enclosure, or the construction of an air tight barrier around the ACM; and 
3) encapsulation, or the coating of the ACM to prevent fiber and dust 
release. r5 
10 Bertrand v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 529 F. Supp. 539, 544 (D. Minn. 
1982). Action brought against manufacturer and seller of asbestos products by 
asbestos insulation installer. The issue was whether the plaintiff could collaterally 
estop the defendants from litigating certain issues. The court held that on the 
issue of disease causation estoppel was appropriate as the fact that asbestos dust 
causes disease is a fact so firmly established that it is not worthy of relitigation. 
II See 40 C.F.R. § 763.100 (1985). 
12 Id. 
13 See Kincade, Issues in School Asbestos Hazard Abatement Litigation, 16 
ST. MARY'S L.J. 951, 955 (1985) [hereinafter: Kincade, Issues). 
14 See e.g. 1985 Conn. Pub. Acts 541. Section 2 of that act states: "Each 
school district shall inspect its school facilities for asbestos and submit a report of 
its findings along with an abatement plan ... ." (emphasis added). 
15 Kincade, Issues at 955 n.15. See also CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 10-_-1: 
Definitions. 
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Abatement procedures are expensive l6 and many municipalities are unable to 
bear the entire financial burden absent outside assistance. The Asbestos School 
Hazard Abatement Act of 1984 provides for financial assistance through an 
"Assistance Program."17 Like many other federally funded assistance programs, the 
granting of aid is premised on financial need. Subsection (d) of section 4014 
states in pertinent part: "In no event shall financial assistance be provided under 
this chapter to an applicant if the Administrator determines that such applicant 
has resources adequate to support an appropriate asbestos materials abatement 
program."18 Thus, financially needy school districts are entitled to a 20 year 
interest free loan of up to one hundred percent of the cost of abatement. 19 If 
the Administrator finds that the district will be unable to perform the necessary 
abatement through a loan, a grant may be given in an amount of up to fifty 
percent of the cost of abatement.20 Districts with "adequate resources" must 
initiate abatement procedures absent any federal assistance. 
Such financial assistance helps to get abatement programs off the ground, but 
is ineffective as a complete remedy because school districts must, over a twenty 
year period, find some way to pay the government back. This would necessarily 
entail drastic long-term budget cuts, resulting in the loss of current school 
programs, teachers, supplies and extracurricular activities. For districts receiving 
no financial assistance, this remedy mandates immediate budget cuts. A further 
pitfall of the federal funding remedy is that the fulfillment of the promise of 
forthcoming money is te~uous at best.21 The most direct and promising alternative 
to reliance on federal funding is direct tort litigation with the asbestos 
manufacturers to recover for damage caused by the unreasonably dangerous 
product. 
Establishing Manufacturer Liability 
The most promising and complete theory upon which manufacturer liability 
can be established is a strict products liability theory under section 402A of the 
Restatement 2d, Torts. That sections reads: 
16 See City of Greenville v. W.R. Grace & Co., 640 F. Supp. 559, 570 (D. 
S.C. 1986). Abatement costs for City Hall clean-up totaled $4,809,000.00. 
17 
18 
19 
20 
20 U.S.C.A. § 4041 (West Supp. 1987). 
Id. at § 4014 (d). 
[d. at § 4014 (e)(I), (f)(2). 
Id. at § 4014 (e)(I). 
21 Kincade, Issues at 956 n.18. In addition to being speculative, federal 
funds cause other problems as well. "In hearings before the House Energy and 
Commerce Subcommittee on Transportation and Commerce, John A. Moore, EPA 
assistant administrator for Pesticides and Toxic Substances, testified that the Act 
is 'likely to be counter-productive because school districts would begin competing 
for the federal funds instead of moving quickly on their own.'" Id. 
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Special Liability of Seller of Product For Physical Harm to 
Consumer 
User or 
(I) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous 
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical 
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if 
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and 
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer in which it 
is sold. 
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although 
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of 
his prod ucts, and 
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered 
into any contractual relation with the seller. 
For a municipality to recover under this section, it must establish a defect in the 
product, a causal link between this defect and the injury to the user or his 
product, and the manufacturer's knowledge that the product would reach the user 
without substantial change in condition.22 We may assume that the last element, 
change in condition, is unchallenged where there is no claim of product tampering 
or alteration. The first two elements however, defect and causal link, are fiercely 
contested issues in asbestos litigation. 
Manufacturer's Duty to Warn 
Comment (j) of the Restatement requires the seller to warn of a danger of 
which it has knowledge, or "by the application of reasonable, developed human skill 
and foresight should have knowledge ... ."23 This requirement that the 
manufacturers warn if it had or should have had knowledge of the danger"ous 
conditions presents many problems for municipal plaintiffs. Defendants offer their 
lack of knowledge at the time of sale as the "state of the art" defense. If there 
was no way for manufacturers to know of the product hazard at the time of sale, 
then section 402A cannot apply and the manufacturers are absolved.24 
The applicability of comment j to asbestos cases is subject to dispute.25 
Recent court decisions addressing the issue have rejected the state of the art 
defense,26 opining that its knowledge and foreseeability analysis "equates the 
22 
(1983). 
23 
24 
25 
See Note, Issues in Asbestos Litigation, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 871, 885-86 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment j (1965). 
Note, Issues in Asbestos Litigation, at 886. 
Id. 
26 See Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 
(1982) and Flatt v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 488 F. Supp. 836 (E.D. Tex. 1980). 
But see Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1982), "strict 
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failure to warn standard applied under strict liability with that applied under a 
negligence theory, thus removing the distinctions between the two causes of 
action.,,27 
In Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., a suit brought by individuals 
who contracted asbestos-related diseases from their exposure to friable asbestos, 
the New Jersey Supreme Court refused to permit the defendant to assert the state 
of the art defense, holding that if the product is in fact dangerous, the knowledge 
of such danger is implied to the defendants.28 In so holding, the Court stressed 
that any further application of a duty to warn based on then-existing knowledge 
would remove the distinction between strict liability and negligence.29 The Court 
stated "that if a product was in fact defective, the distribution of the product 
should compensate its victims for the misfortune that is inflicted on them.,,30 
In Flatt v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., an action involving the same issue as 
Beshada, the district court held that the defendants could not avail themselves of 
the state the art defense:31 
Evidence relating to the state of the art at the time of manufacture is 
relevant only to the issue of due care in the manufacturing process, a 
negligence concept not at issue in this strict liability action.... Regardless of 
what was reasonably foreseeable to the defendants at the time of 
manufacture, asbestos products should have been accompanied by adequate 
warnings; the nature of this strict liability action makes the defendants' state 
of knowledge at the time of manufacture irrelevant. The J:!roduct and 
warnings attachec;! thereto are in issue, not the defendants' conduct.32 
However, two years later, the 5th Circuit, in Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales 
Corp., though not explicitly overruling Flatt, held that "strict liability because of 
failure to warn is based on a determination of the manufacturer's reasonable 
knowledge."33 This statement would appear to reinstate the state of the art 
defense, because reasonable knowledge at the time of sale is relevant to establish 
liability because of failure to warn is based on determination of the manufacturer's 
reasonable knowledge" at 344. 
27 Note, Issues in Asbestos Litigation at 886. 
28 90 N.J. 191,447 A.2d 539, 543 (1982). 
29 447 A.2d at 546. 
30 Id. 
31 488 F. Supp. 836, 841 (E.D. Tex. 1980). 
32 Id. at 841-42. 
33 681 F.2d 334, 344 (5th Cir. 1982). 
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whether the defendant breached a duty by failing to warn. 
The approach taken by the courts which eliminate the state of the art 
defense is the wiser analysis. Comment (a) of section 402A purports to "make the 
seller subject to liability to the user or consumer even though he has exercised all 
possible care in the preparation and sale of the product."34 The care required in 
the sale of the product should include marketing and warnings. The knowledge 
and foreseeability element of comment (j) should be removed from all products 
liability action, not just asbestos cases. 
If neither party is aware of the risks, the party best able to bear them 
should be forced to do so, because consumers are incapable of paying the high 
costs which the risks impose, especially when the consumer is a municipality with 
a tight fixed budget. Manufacturers on the other hand need only increase the 
price of their products a small percentage to meet the increase in insurance 
premiums which are inevitable if strict liability is applied in the strictest sense, 
without regard to knowledge and foreseeability. 
Placement of liability on manufacturers, regardless of what they knew at the 
time of sale would encourage more testing and research of new products prior to 
marketing if the new product will expose the consumers to unwarranted danger.35 
More expansive safety research will advance the policy of accident avoidance while 
not stifling technological advancements. 
Actual Notice 
If the state of the art defense is not abolished, plaintiffs must be prepared to 
prove that manufacturers in fact had knowledge sufficient to require warnings 
regarding asbestos related hazards. In Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 
the Court held that "a seller is under a duty to warn of only those dangers that 
are reasonably foreseeable. The requirement of foreseeability coincides with the 
standard of due care in negligence cases in that a seller must exercise reasonable 
care and foresight to discover a danger in his product and to warn users and 
consumers of that danger.,,36 Despite this rule which favors the defendants much 
more than the Beshada approach, the court still found the defendants liable for 
failure to warn.37 
In Borel, the defendants argued that the danger from inhaling asbestos was 
not foreseeable until "about 1968."38 The Court held that the jury, relying on 
34 
added). 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §402A comment (a) (1965) (emphasis 
35 "By imposing on manufacterurs the cost of failure to discover hazards, we 
create an incentive for them to invest more actively in safety research." Beshada, 
447 A.2d at 548. 
36 Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1088 (5th Cir. 
1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974)(emphasis added). 
37 [d. at 1093. 
38 [d. at 1092. 
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expert witness testimony, could find that the danger of inhaling asbestos was 
recognized as early as the 1930's.39 One witness, Dr. Hans Weill, testified that 
"prior to 1935 there were literally dozens and dozens of articles on asbestos and 
its effects on man."40 A plaintiff's expert witness, Dr. Clark Cooper, stated that 
"it was known in the 1930's that inhaling asbestos dust caused asbestosis41 and 
that the danger could be controlled by maintaining a modest level of exposure."42 
The Court cited findings by the American Conference bf Governmental Industrial 
Hygienists which in 1947 issued guidelines "suggesting 1hreshold limit values for 
exposure to asbestos dust."43 A 1947 report relied on by the plaintiffs warned of 
respiratory diseases resulting from exposure to asbestos dust.44 
After considering all of this evidence, the Court held that "once the danger 
became foreseeable, the duty to warn attached."45 Even the lenient application of 
the strict liability analysis resulted in a finding of manufacturer liability. If 
municipal plaintiffs can effectively utilize this and similar testimony, the state of 
the art defense will fail, to the extent that plaintiffs can establish that the state 
of the art throughout the period of installation included the knowledge of serious 
health risks. 
Knowledge of the Dangers of Low Level Radiation 
The next obstacle which municipal plaintiffs face is the fact that all prior 
litigation concerning the knowledge of health risks focused on high levels of 
exposure. The issue which 
is "firmly entrenched in the medical and legal literature" such that it is "not 
subject to serious dispute"46 is that high levels of 'q<;cupational asbestos exposure 
causes severe health risks. If lower levels associated with exposure to school 
, 
children do not pose similar risks, the fact that the state of the art defense is 
abolished or strictly applied will be of no consequence. If school children and 
municipal workers face no health risks, then the ;'.asbestos is not unreasonably 
dangerous with respect to municipal plaintiffs. Despite the congressional findings 
that asbestos in schools presents a risk of harm to children,47 the defendants are 
free to litigate the risk of this harm as such findings do not affect the legal 
39 [d. 
40 [d. 
41 [d. 
42 [d. at 1092-93. 
43 [d. at 1093. 
44 [d. 
45 [d. at 1089. 
46 Bertrand, 529 F. Supp. 539, 544 (D. Minn. 1982). 
47 See supra note II and accompanying text. 
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rights of any party.48 
In jurisdictions abolishing the state of the art defense, defendants will argue 
that knowledge of the danger is imputed to them if and only if there is actual 
danger. If low levels of exposure are in fact harmless, there can be no liability. 
In jurisdictions employing the state of the art defense, defendants can argue that 
the knowledge in the 1930's and 1940's of risks posed by high level exposure did 
not constitute knowledge of risks present in low level exposure situations. 
To overcome this problem, plaintiffs must propose jury instructions which 
allow juries to impute the knowledge of asbestos hazards in high level situations to 
those involving lower level. In Kar jala v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., the court 
upheld such an instruction.49 The Eighth Circuit approved an instruction which 
informed the jury that factory workers risked disease due to asbestos exposure, 
and that knowledge of this risk was known to the manufacturer at least as early 
as 1942.50 Though the plaintiff was an installation worker and not a factory 
worker, thus subject to lower levels of exposure, it was for the jury to decide 
whether the knowledge with respect to factory workers put the defendant on 
notice of the danger to the plaintiff in his capacity as an installation worker.51 
Similarly, municipal plaintiffs may argue that the known hazards associated with 
occupational exposure created a duty to warn due to the foreseeability of health 
risks in non-occupational settings.52 
Given the knowledge of the risks available in the 1930's and 40's, the 
reinforcement of that knowledge in the 1950's and 60's,53 and the knowledge of 
the manufacturers that millions of people would come in contact with their 
products, it is not unreasonable to find, as a matter of law, that a risk exists, 
that it was realized at the time of sale, and that warnings were required. The 
only alternative - waiting twenty or so years to determine if, in fact, low level 
exposure is harmful - is unreasonable as this would create a disincentive for 
municipalities to take corrective action, thereby exposing many more children to 
the potentially harmful product while the manifestation period runs. 
Suppression of Information 
Another argument which plaintiffs may advance to establish that 
manufacturers should have known about risks posed by low level exposure is that 
the suppression of medical findings severely limited the public's knowledge of the 
48 20 V.S.C.A. §4019 (West Supp. 1987). 
49 523 F.2d 155, 159 (8th Cir. 1975). 
50 Id. at 158. 
51 Id. 
52 See Kincade, Issues at 960. 
53 See Motley, The Lid Comes Off, 16 TRIAL, April, 1980, at 21. 
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hazards, and consequently stifled further testing which may have revealed the 
extent of the risks involved. 
According to one commentator, the president of Raybestos-Manhattan in 1935 
denied permission to the editor of Asbestos, a trade journal, to print the results of 
a British study documenting the occupational hazard of asbestos dust inhalation.54 
President Simpson later thanked the editor for following the directive, stating: 
"the less said about asbestos, the better off we are ... .',55 Johns-Manville 
maintained a policy of withholding the confirmed diagnosis of asbestosis from its 
workers while they were still able to work lest they "become mentally and 
physically ill, simply through the knowledge that [they have) asbestosis."56 
Workers with the disease were denied treatment and were forced to suffer 
continued exposure to the very mineral causing their disease, as knowledge of such 
disease might result in depression at home and on the job. 
Had the extensive nature of asbestos-related diseases been publicized during 
the 1930's and 40's, further studies could have and probably would have been 
performed. These studies could have resulted in findings that low level exposure 
situations pose a substantial risk of health problems. Because of the industrial 
cover-up, the risk of low level exposure remains speculative. The manufacturers 
should not be permitted to use this speculation as a defense in light of the fact 
that the lack of conclusive evidence pertaining to low level situations was a direct 
result of their misconduct. 
Proving the Injury 
Having established that the defendants knew or should have known about a 
hazardous condition that causes injury, the plaintiff's final element of proof is that 
the product in fact caused such injury. As stated above, the 'municipality as 
plaintiff' case is unique in that there is admittedly no personal injury. In order to 
recover, the plaintiff must establish physical injury to the consumer's property. If 
no physical injury is established, section 402A will not apply and the plaintiff will 
be limited to contract recovery for damages contemplated by the parties at the 
time of forming the contract.57 
Physical Injury or Economic Loss 
What the plaintiff actually seeks is the cost to remove and replace the 
defective product. Such causes of action are usually defined as actions for 
54 [d. 
55 [d. at 22. 
56 [d. at 24. 
57 See Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. Ch. 341, 355, 156 Eng. Rep. 145, _ 
(1854). "Where two parties have made a contract which one of them has broken, 
the damages ... ought [to be). .. such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in 
the contemplation of both parties, at the time they made the contract, as the 
probable result of the breach of it." 
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economic loss,58 and are usually decided under the Uniform Commercial Code 
(UCC). "The [UCC] is generally regarded as the exclusive source for ascertaining 
when a seller is subject to liability for damages if the claim is based on intangible 
economic loss not attributable to physical injury to person or harm to a tangible 
thing other than the defective product itself."59 
The defendant will assert that the UCC precludes a strict liability recovery, 
as the dangerous condition of asbestos results only in deterioration of the product 
itself and causes no personal or physical injury. "When the defect causes an 
accident 'involving some violence or collision with external objects' the resulting 
loss is treated as property damage. On the other hand, when the damage to the 
product results from deterioration, internal breakage or other non-accidental 
causes, it is treated as economic loss.,,60 To counter these assertions, the plaintiff 
must establish that the dangerous condition caused by the presence of asbestos 
does produce a collision, thereby satisfying the physical injury requirement of 
section 402A. 
Although no reported decision has couched the asbestos cause of action in 
such terms, the physical injury necessary for tort recovery can be cast as having 
arisen from "some violence or collision with an external object.,,61 This collision 
can result in one of two ways. First, the presence of the ACM creates an 
inevitable collision between the building itself and the municipality's effort to 
remove it. In other words, "the physical act of ripping out and tearing away the 
asbestos material from other parts of the school building reflects damage to 
property other than the product itself."62 The second form of collision is that 
which occurs when the friable asbestos fibers and dust break away from the 
product and land on other parts of the building and its occupants. Though these 
particles may be invisible and float through the air like feathers, their impact is 
significant. 
A recent decision by the Alaska Supreme Court provides insightful, though 
not binding, support to the first theory of collision.63 In Shooshanian v. Wagner, 
the Court held that where plaintiff sought costs for tearing out inner walls of its 
building in order to reach and remove noxious insulation, a cause of action in 
58 See Note, Economic Loss in Products Liability Jurisprudence, 66 COLUM 
L. REV. 917 (I 966). 
59 See W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 95A, at 680 
(5th ed. 1984). 
60 Note, Economic Loss at 918 (quoting Fentress v. Van Etta Motors, 157 
Cal. App. 2d 863, 866, 323 P.2d 277, 229 (Super. Ct. App. Dep't. 1958» (emphasis added). 
61 The collision test is discussed in Fentress v. Van Etta Motors, supra note 
60. 
62 Kincade, Issues at 970. 
63 672 P.2d 455 (Alaska 1983). 
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strict products liability could be maintained.64 The plaintiffs had no choice but to 
pursue procedures which would alter their living and working environment. Though 
the Court did not use 'collision' language, it can be applied without great strain. 
Alteration of the environment was necessary to abate the hazard. It created an 
inevitable collision in the form of tearing up the walls and ceilings, and no one 
would deny that this constitutes physical damage. As long as the defendant's 
conduct made this damage necessary, an action should lie. 
In an analogous situation, a defendant is liable for trespass if, without 
entering the land of another, he forces a third person onto the plaintiff's land, or 
coerces him to enter through fear or false representations.65 The defendant's act 
caused the harm, and liability is established. In the asbestos case, the defendant's 
manufacture of a hazardous product and his failure to warn caused the plaintiff to 
harm his own building. This resulting harm should be charged to the defendant. 
The second collision theory does not appear to have much (if any) reported 
precedent, although a recent unpublished opinion from the District Court of South 
Carolina indicates that such a theory is viable.66 In City 0/ Greenville v. W.R. 
Grace & Co., the district court, though not using the term 'collision,' held that 
where asbestos fibers broke away and landed on other parts of the building, the 
building had suffered physical damage.67 In an action to recover asbestos 
abatement costs incurred in cleansing Greenville's City Hall, the jury found that 
asbestos materials were falling off the infrastructure beams and landing on ceiling 
tiles. City experts tested for the presence of fibers and found "invisible asbestos 
fibers on every building surface tested in amounts of up to millions of fibers per 
square foot of surface area."68 Asbestos contaminated both carpets and ceiling 
tiles as well.69 The Court's consistent use of the terms 'contamination,' and 
'landed' reconcile the asbestos deterioration with the need to find an accident or 
collision. Each fiber-causing contamination is the result of a. collision between the 
fiber and'the building, this collision producing a danger of harm to the building's 
occupants. Such contamination caused by the landing fibers is sufficient to create 
a physical injury aside from mere deterioration or other economic loss. 
Summary of Cause of Action 
To establish manufacturer liability, the municipal plaintiff should move to 
64 !d. at 464. 
65 See PROSSER & KEETON at 72-3. 
66 City of Greenville v. W.R. Grace & Co., 640 F. Supp. 559 (D.S.C. 1986). 
67 [d. at 7. 
68 [d. at 3. 
69 [d. 
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strike the state of the art defense as it does not comply with a strict liability 
theory. If this effort is unsuccessful, the plaintiff must establish actual knowledge 
on the part of the manufacturer at the time of sale sufficient to require a 
warning. This may be done either by imputing the existing knowledge concerning 
high level risk situations to low level exposure situations or by establishing that 
the lack of risk awareness at the time of sale was due to the defendant's own 
misconduct in suppressing information. 
Finally, the plaintiff must establish a physical injury in order to avoid UCC 
limitations. This can be accomplished by demonstrating the physical injury to the 
building through a collision theory. One form of collision occurs when the 
plaintiff tears apart the building to gain access to the ACM The second form of 
coli is ion occurs when the asbestos fibers break away and contaminate the building. 
Conclusion 
The flexibility of progressive courts in dealing with the issue of foreseeability 
and physical harm should enable municipal plaintiffs to establish valid causes of 
action under section 402A of the Restatement. This will enable these plaintiffs to 
recover the expenses of abatement procedures from manufacturers instead of 
bearing the burden themselves. Establishing manufacturer liability will enable 
municipalities to continue operation without cutting valuable services such as 
education, police protection, fire prevention, and road/sewer maintenance. This 
liability also comports with the policy of making society pay the expenses of 
technology a little at a time, instead of forcing individual victims to pay in large 
lump sums. 
ASBESTOS UPDATE 
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals recently affirmed the judgment in City 
0/ Greenville v. W.R. Grace & Co., 640 F. Supp. 559 (D.S.C. 1986), holding that the 
company knew of the danger from their product and that the product was 
defective. City 0/ Greenville v. W.R. Grace & Co., No. 86-26096 (4th Cir. Sept. 4, 
1987). 
However, the Supreme Court of Virginia, in School Board v. Gypsum Co., No. 
870265 (1987), denied recovery by the Norfolk School Board for the cost of 
removing products containing asbestos from school buildings. Importantly, the 
decision was based on the relevant statute of limitations rather than a theory of 
recovery. 
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EMOTIONAL DISTRESS WITH A FAILED LIBEL CLAIM: 
THE FAULTY LOGIC OF FALWELL V. FLYNT 
by 
Elizabeth M. Campbell 
Some degree of abuse is inseparable from the properuse of every thing, and 
in no instance is this more true than in that of the press. 
It has accordingly been decided ... that it is better to leave a few of its 
noxious branches to their luxuriant growth, than by pruning them away, to 
injure the vigor of those yielding the proper fruits. I 
James Madison's remark during the Constitutional debates remains the 
underlying principle governing the disposition of cases involving first amendment 
freedom of speech issues. In order to protect and encourage robust public debate-
-to preserve the "marketplace of ideas"--the United States Supreme Court has 
interpreted the language of the first amendment liberally, placing only certain 
limited categories of speech outside its purview and protection. Obscenity2, child 
pornography3, and words that incite people to riot4 are examples of speech the 
Court deems unprotected. 
The Court also excludes libelous speech from first amendment protection. 
Generally, the legal system embodied in the Constitution and the Bill of Rights 
does not favor publication of falsities that defame or harm the reputation of 
others. Defamation, libel or slander is a communication that tends to harm the 
reputation of someone, The harm occurs when the community lowers its estimation 
of the defamed and the communication deters third persons from dealing or 
associating with him.5 
Although a court finds a communication non-defamatory the plaintiff may still 
suffer emotional distress from the publication. The libel plaintiff may therefore 
opt to bring a claim for intentional infliction of emotional or mental distress. 
The mental distr~ss action protects a plaintiff's interest in his peace of 
mind.6 The courts have been slow to redress emotional injury for a number of 
Renwick v. News & Observer Publishing Co., 310 N.C. 312, 326, 312 S.E.2d 
405, 413, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 858 (1984) (quoting 4 Elliot's Debates on the 
Federal Constitution 571 (1876 Ed.)). 
2 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
3 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. '747 (1982). 
4 Brandenburg v. 'Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
5 W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § III at 739 (4th ed. 1971). 
6 [d. § 12, at 49. 
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reasons.? In recent years, however, judges have become more willing to allow 
recovery under this tort.8 Furthermore, plaintiffs are now pleading emotional 
distress as well as libel in suits against the media.9 
An example of a recent suit involving both libel and infliction of emotional 
distress claims is Falwell v. Flynt. IO In Falwell, the Reverend Jerry Falwell sued 
Larry Flynt, publisher of Hustler Magazine. Hustler had run an advertisement that 
portrayed Falwell as engaging in a drunken incestuous relationship with his mother 
in an outhouse in Lynchburg, Virginia. Falwell sued Flynt under three theories: 
defamation, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
At trial in the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Virginia, the jury returned a mixed verdict. I I While Falwell lost his libel and 
invasion of privacy claims, the jury found Flynt guilty of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. It awarded Falwell $200,000 in damages for his mental pain and 
suffering. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed this 
decision. I2 The Supreme Court has granted certiorari. 
Falwell raises serious questions about freedom of speech under the first 
amendment. Only a few decisions have granted emotional distress claims when a 
libel claim failed. I3 Before Falwell, no court had allowed a public figure plaintiff 
to receive damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress for a publication 
which a jury found could not reasonably be interpreted as making any statements 
of fact. 
A court can use one of three approaches when faced with an intentional 
infliction of emotional distress claim accompanying a failed libel claim. First, the 
court may do as the Fourth Circuit did in Falwell and treat the two causes of 
action as entirely separate and independent (the separateness approach). In these 
cases a distress claim may survive the demise of plaintiff's libel claim and the 
court will treat an individual's interest in injury to peace of" mind independently of 
first amendment interests. 
7 Id. at 50-51. Prosser cites reasons such as difficulty of proof, difficulty 
in measuring damages and judicial fear of sham claims for mental injury. 
8 See generally Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CALIF. L. REV. 40 (1956). 
9 Mead, Suing Media For Emotional Distress: A Multi-Method Analysis oj 
Tort Law Evolution, 23 WASHBURN L.J. 24, 35 (1983) [hereinafter Mead, Suing 
Media]. 
10 797 F.2d 1270 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. granted sub nom., HustIer Magazine v. 
Falwell, 107 S. Ct. 1601 (1987). 
II Falwell v. Flynt, No. 83-0155-L-R, slip op. (W.O. Va. April 16, 1985). 
12 Falwell, 797 F.2d 1270 (4th Cir. 1986). 
13 See Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, 595 F.2d 1265 (3d Cir. 
1979). See also Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1974). In the Firestone case 
it is less clear that the plaintiff's recovery was indeed for emotional distress. 
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claim rise and fall with a libel claim (the contingency approach), as long as there 
is a public figure or matter of public interest involved and the communication is 
not conveying false statements of fact. In these cases, first amendment concerns 
will override an individual's interest in recovering for personal distress. 
Third, the court, after determining that a plaintiff indeed satisfies the statutory 
or common law standard for intentional infliction of severe mental distress, may 
weigh that plaintiff's interest in peace of mind against the value of the speech at 
issue. The court will examine the purpose and content of the speech: whether 
the speech is informative or educational, or, whether it is merely exploitive or 
entertaining. A judge determines if the first amendment interest in not 
suppressing the speech is enough to overcome the public figure's interest in 
recovering for mental harm. If the speech contributes to the marketplace of ideas, 
then first amendment concerns will prevail and the distress claim will die. But, if 
the court finds that the speech does not contribute to robust public debate, then 
the distress claim may survive in spite of first amendment objections. 
This note will examine these three approaches in light of Falwell v. Flynt 14 
and related cases while considering the distress and libel causes of action and the 
interests each protect. It will suggest that the "contingency" approach holds the 
most merit and suggest that first amendment protection should apply to any claim 
which may damage freedo~ of the press or freedom of speech. Allowing a plaintiff 
to recover for hurt feelings as a result of an unpleasant or insulting publication 
circumvents the stringent defamation requirements set forth in New York Times Co. 
v. Sullivan. 15 Permitting someone to bypass the requirement of proving "actual or 
constitutional malice" by merely showing common law malice l6 required by the tort 
of intentional infliction of emotional distress poses a danger to freedom of speech 
and will likely chill the exercise of this constitutional right. The central issue 
addressed in this article is whether a public figure plaintiff should recover damages 
under the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress based on facts 
insufficient to support a cause of action for defamation when the publication in 
question contains no 
assertions of fact. 
The Facts of Falwell v. Flynt 
Falwell l7 arose from Hustler Magazine's publication of one of a series of 
advertisements for Campari liqueur that featured certain celebrities talking about 
14 797 F.2d 1270 (4th Cir. 1986). 
15 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
16 Common law malice is ill will or spite, thus meaning that motive is all 
important. Constitutional or actual malice instead focuses on whether a defendant 
knew her publication was false or published it with reckless disregard of whether 
it was false or not. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964). 
17 797 F.2d 1270 (4th Cir. 1986). All of the facts in the next several pages 
of text are taken from the published opinion and the two opening briefs of counsel 
for Falwell and Flynt. Opening Brief for Appellant at 2-5, Flynt v. Falwell, 797 
F.2d 1270 (4th Cir. 1986) (No. 85-1417 (L) consolidated with No. 85-1480). 
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their "first time." These celebrities related their first time drinking Campari, but 
the ads carried sexual connotations as well. The ad featuring Jerry Falwell 
portrayed him as intoxicated from the liqueur when his "first time" was with his 
mother behind an outhouse in Lynchburg, Virginia. It ad portrayed Falwell as a 
drunkard and as having engaged in an incestuous relationship with his deceased 
mother. 
The parody appeared in the section of Hustler entitled "FICTION; Ad and 
Personality Parody." Furthermore, the ad contained a disclaimer which read "AD 
PARODY--NOT TO BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY." In response, Falwell brought suit 
against Hustler Magazine, Inc., publisher Larry Flynt, and Flynt Distributing 
Company, Inc. Five months later Hustler re-published the ad in its March 1985 
issue. 
Falwell filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District 
of Virginia. He sued the three defendants alleging three causes of action: libel, 
invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district 
court dismissed the privacy claim under Virginia state law which permits recovery 
for invasion of privacy only if a plaintiff's name and likeness is used "for purposes 
of trade."18 The court "barred the invasion of privacy recovery because the name 
or likeness must be infected with substantial falsification and a reader must 
reasonably believe the falsification. Because the jury found the parody was not 
believable, Falwell had no cognizable claim for invasion of privacy. 
The jury found no reasonable person could believe that the ad parody 
conveyed statements of fact about Jerry Falwell. In order to prevail on a libel 
cause of action, a public figure plaintiff must prove constitutional actual malice--
that the defendant knowingly or with reckless disregard published falsities about 
the plaintiff. Because the ad was not false it could not libel the well-known 
Reverend Falwell. The jury thus found for defendant Flynt on the libel claim. 
The claim for emotional distress 
The court then addressed the most interesting part of the case: Falwell's 
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. The jury viewed several pieces 
of evidence over defendant's objections. The jury saw a video tape of Flynt's 
deposition in which he testified that he wanted to upset Falwell and to assassinate 
his integrity.19 The District Judge also admitted into evidence prior issues of 
18 Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-40 (\985). 
19 The following is an excerpt from the deposition of Larry Flynt taken by 
Falwell's counsel: 
Q. Did you want to upset Reverend Falwell? 
A. yes .... 
Q. Do you recognize that in having published what you did in this ad, you 
were attempting to convey to the people who read read it that Reverend Falwell 
was just as you characterized him, a liar? 
A. He's a glutton. 
Q. How about a liar? 
A. Yeah. He's a liar, too. 
Q. How about a hypocrite? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. That's what you wanted to convey? 
A. Yeah. 
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Hustler that had ridiculed Falwell. The jury concluded that Flynt had intended to 
cause Falwell emotional distress and awarded him $100,000 actual damages. The jury 
also assessed $50,000 punitive damages against Flynt and $50,000 punitive damages 
against Hustler. On appeal the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit upheld the district court's ruling. On defendant's petition for rehearing 
with suggestion for rehearing en banc the Fourth Circuit denied rehearing five to 
four.20 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1987. 
The Evolution of the Law of Defamation 
The first amendment provides "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press.,,21 Some legal scholars and judges construe 
this language to mean that absolutely no speech should be punishable. Although 
this sounds extreme, Justice Black conceded that when speech is accompanied by 
disorderly conduct it may not be protected.22 
For those on the opposite end of the spectrum, government censorship and 
content-based restrictions are a matter of course. Consider people who espouse 
the views of the far right. They favor censoring rock music containing lyrics they 
find offensive and banning school books that embody philosophies with which they 
do not agree. The history of defamation law in the United States displays a series 
of movements along the spectrum between these two extremes. 
The Sedition Act of 1798 made criticism of members of Congress and the 
Q. And didn't it occur to you that if it wasn't true, you were attacking a 
man in his profession? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you appreciate, at the time that you wrote "okay" or approved this 
publication, that for Reverend Falwell to function in his livelihood, and in his 
commitment and career, he has to have an integrity that people believe in? Did 
you not appreciate that? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. And wasn't one of your objectives to destroy that integrity, or harm it, 
if you could? 
A. To assassinate it. 
Falwell, 797 F.2d 1270, 1273 (4th Cir. 1986). Flynt's counsel tried desperately to 
exclude the video tape from evidence on the grounds that Flynt was incompetent 
because the deposition was taken while Flynt was in prison right after his leg had 
been broken. When asked, .he identified himself as Christopher Columbus 
Cornwallis I.P.Q. Harvey H. Apache Pugh and claimed that the ad parody had been 
written by rock stars Yoko Ono and Billy Idol. Counsel said he was at the peak 
of a manic phase of a maniC-depressive psychological disorder at the time. 
Opening Brief for Appellant at 5. . 
20 Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270 (4th Cir. 1986), reh'g denied, 805 F.2d 484 
(4th Cir. 1986), cert. granted sub. nom., Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 107 S. Ct. 
1601 (1987). 
21 U.S. Const. amend I. 
22 Justice Black and the First Amendment "Absolutes": A Public Interview, 
37 N.Y.U.L. REV. 549 (1962). The well known example Justice Black cites is 
someone shouting "Fire!" in a crowded theater. 
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President a crime.23 In addition, States once imposed strict liability defamation 
statutes. The State and private plaintiffs thus had a relatively easy time in 
succeeding with defamation suits. The guarantees of the first amendment did not 
became firmly embedded in our constitutional scheme until 1964 when the Supreme 
Court handed down New York Times Co. v. Sullivan24. .In New York Times, the 
Court said that a public official plaintiff, in order to win a defamation claim, must 
prove that the allegedly defamatory communication "was made with actual malice--
that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it 
was false or not."25 The "actual malice" standard the Court defined was a marked 
departure from the common law malice standard which turned on the defendant's 
intent: whether ill will or spite motivated the publication. The actual 
malice/reckless disregard standard presents a high threshold for plaintiffs in 
defamation cases. A mere failure to investigate is not reckless disregard; rather, a 
defendant must have entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication 
in order to fall under the actual malice heading.26 
In Gertz v. Robert Welch. Inc .. 27 the Supreme Court distinguished between 
the burden of proof on public and private figures. Dun and Bradstreet v. 
Greenmoss Builders28 may have complicated the picture further by subjecting 
matters of private concern and public concern to different standards of proof by 
plaintiffs. Depending therefore upon who the communication was about and its 
subject matter, different proof requirements may apply. The end result is that 
plaintiffs have mored difficulty than ever winning libel claims. Two decisions 
handed down in 1986 reaffirm the Supreme Court's commitment to first amendment 
23 L. Eldredge, The Law of Defamation 247 (1978). 
24 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
25 Id. at 279-80. 
26 St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968). 
27 418 U.S. 323 (1974). "Gertz established that suits ~,rought by public 
officials and public figures, at least against media defendants,must always meet 
the actual-malice test. Second, all, defamation suits, even those by private 
plaintiffs based on communications about nonpublic issues, must not provide for 
liability unless there is a showing of fault. Third, damages may no longer be 
awarded without proof of injury, although a broad range of injury is still 
compensable and the proof requirements are not stringent. Finally, there must be 
proof of actual malice before punitive damages may be awarded." (citations 
omitted). Smolla, Let the Author Beware: The Rejuvenation of the American Law 
of Libel, 132 U. PA. L. REV. I, 10 (1983). 
28 472 U.S. 749 (1985). In a suit by a private plaintiff over a matter of 
private concern the Court held that the plaintiff does not have to prove reckless 
disregard for the truth by defendant. 
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freedoms. In Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc.,29 the Court held that a plaintiff 
must provide "clear and convincing" preliminary evidence that the defendant acted 
with actual malice even on a motion for summary judgement. The Court ruled in 
Philadelphia Newspapers Inc. v. Hepps30 that in order to receive damages for libel 
a private-figure plaintiff must show that the allegedly defamatory communication 
was false. 
Evolution of the Tort of Intentional 
Infliction of Emotional Distress 
The emotional or mental distress tort is a relative newcomer to the 
redressable injury group. Early on, courts refused to allow any sort of recovery 
for mental injury unless the plaintiff had suffered some physical injury or other 
objective manifestation of serious emotional distress in order to deny spurious 
claims.31 Courts came to recognize recovery for emotional distress by 
piggybacking the claim on some other tort. For instance, in State Rubbish 
Collectors Association v. Silizno!! the defendant threatened bodily harm to a 
garbage man who refused to make extortion payments; plaintiff sued for assault 
and mental distress and won on both counts.32 Prosser describes these ·parasitic· 
damages as a wedge in the door toward the eventual wide open independence of 
the distress tort.33 A psycholologist's testimony as to a victim's mental state 
without proof of adverse physical symptoms proximately caused by stress prevented 
recovery. Judges understandably are wary of sham claims of emotional injury. 
Objective manifestations of emotional distress or physical injury legitimize 
plaintiffs' claims. 
Some courts, however, have allowed recovery for extreme and outrageous 
29 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986). A citizen's lobbying organization sued a media 
defendant for three articles about the group that it claimed were defamatory. The 
Supreme Court reversed the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit with Justice White mandating that the plaintiffs must 'show clear 
and convincing evidence of actual malice by defendants in order to be granted 
summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
30 106 S. Ct. 1558 (1986). In Hepps a private figure plaintiff sued a 
newspaper for allegedly defamatory statements linking the plaintiff to organized 
crime. The Supreme Court held that the communication was a matter of public 
concern and that the plaintiff must bear the burden of proving the speech was 
false. 
31 W. Prosser, supra note 5, § 12 at 51. 
32 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d 282 (1952). 
33 W. Prosser, supra note 5, § 12, at 52. Prosser recognizes that elements 
that start out as dependent or parasitic usually evolve into independent legal creatures. 
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conduct where plaintiffs do not show bodily harm.34 These courts require that 
defendant's conduct meet a four-part test: (I) the conduct must be intentional or 
reckless; (2) the conduct must be extreme and outrageous; (3) a causal connection 
must link the wrongful conduct to the plaintiff's emotional distress; and (4) the 
emotional distress must be severe.35 Prosser postulates that the emotional distress 
claim has developed to accomodate circumstances where ·conduct exceed[s] all 
bounds usually tolerated by decent society, of a nature which is especially 
calculated to cause, and does cause, mental distress of a very serious kind. The 
requirements of the rule are rigorous and difficult to satisfy."36 The examples 
Prosser gives of conduct that falls within this category include spreading false 
rumors about plaintiff's son's suicide37, a practical joker telling a woman her 
Husband had just been in an accident and broken both his legs,38 and mishandling 
of dead bodies.39 
Subjection to insults, indignity, profanity, obscenity or abuse should not be 
sufficient to constitute a cause of action under the tort of infliction of mental 
distress. A tough mental hide40 is still expected of people living in the everyday 
world. 
There is still in this country at least, such a thing as liberty to express an 
unflattering opinion of another however wounding it may to the other's 
feelings; and in the interest not only of freedom of speech but also 
avoidance of other more dangerous conduct, it is still very desirable that 
some safety valve be left through which rascible tempers may blow off 
relatively harmless steam.41 
A tension exists between compensating plaintiffs who have genuinely suffered 
injury from a defendant's speech or conduct, and preserving a defendant's first 
amendment right to voice his opinions about the plaintiff. On the one hand, 
undermining a plaintiff's right to be compensated for severe emotional injury is not 
34 See, e.g., Savage v. Boies, 77 Ariz. 355, 272 P.2d 349 (1954); Wilson v. 
Wilkins, 181 Ark. 137, 25 S.W. 2d 428 (1930); Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. 
Roch, 160 Md. 189, 153 A. 22 (1930). 
35 Womack v. Eldridge, 215 Va. 338, 342, 210 S.E.2d 145, 148 (1974). 
Virginia seems to only allow recovery absent physical injury when these four 
elements are proven. 
36 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1965). 
37 Bielitski v. Obadiak, 61 D.L.R. 494 (1921). 
38 Wilkinson v. Downton, 2 Q.B.D. 57 [1897]. 
39 Eckenrode v. Life of Am. Ins. Co., 470 F.2d I (7th Cir. 1972). 
40 Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbances in the Law of Torts, 49 
HARV. L. REV. 1033, 1035 (1936). 
41 W. Prosser, supra note 5, § 12, at 54. 
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desirable. On the other hand, the first amendment considerations of promoting 
open, robust debate should not be ignored either. The following analyses discuss 
these competing interests with three methods of resolving their conflicts and the 
advantages and disadvantages of each approach. 
The Separateness Approach 
Treating the torts of emotional distress and libel as mutually independent 
holds much logical appeal. Until recently, the torts have evolved separately and 
distinctly with no apparent overlap or intertwining.42 Theoretically the two causes 
of action protect different interests. Emotional distress recovery protects a 
plaintiff's interest in his peace of mind; a libel recovery protects against injury to 
a plaintiff's reputation. In most courts,the emotional distress tort now has a 
viability of its own. No longer must a plaintiff bring some other cause of action 
to serve as a vehicle for emotional distress recovery. 43 
The United States court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Falwell, 
applying Virginia law, has recognized independent recovery for intentional infliction 
of emotional distress. The failure of an accompanying libel claim did not deter the 
court from upholding Falwell's $200,000 award for emotional distress. The 
court in Falwell found authority for its position in Womack v. Eldridge,44 a 1974 
Virginia case setting out a four-part test for recovery for emotional distress 
absent physical injury.45 The Fourth Circuit upheld the district court jury's 
finding that Flynt's conduct was intentional and outrageous. They found his 
conduct proximately caused Falwell's distress and that his distress was severe.46 
Falwell thus met Virginia's standard of recovery for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. 
For the proposition that an emotional distress claim may survive despite the 
failure of other tortious claims, the Fourth Circuit need only have looked to its 
own decision in Rafferty v. SCOtl.47 Rafferty involved a husband suing his former 
wife for attempting to destroy his relationship with his son. He sought recovery 
under two theories: alienation of affection and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. The Fourth Circuit found the husband could not successfully sue for 
42 See generally Mead, Suing Media, supra note 9, at 35; Libel Defense 
Resource Center, 50-State Survey 1985-86 (\ 986) [hereinafter LDRC Survey]; Note, 
First Amendment Limits on Tort Liability for Words Intended to Inflict Severe 
Emotional Distress, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1749 (\ 985). 
43 See LDRC Survey, supra note 42. 
44 215 Va. 338, 342, 210 S.E.2d 145, 148 (\974). 
45 See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text. 
46 Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270 (4th Cir. 1986). 
47 756 F.2d 335 (\ 985). 
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alienation of affection under a Virginia statute48, but nevertheless held the facts 
were sufficient to support a finding of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress.49 "The fact that a tort may have overtones of affection alienation does 
not bar recovery on the separate and distinct accompanying wrongdoing.-50 
Recognizing the high threshold of proof a plaintiff must overcome for 
recovery for distress the court declared "[i]ntentional infliction of emotional 
distress and alienation of affection are two distinct causes of action ... not only 
are the elements of the two causes of action different, butintentional infliction of 
emotional distress implies a higher burden of proof than alienation of affection."51 
The four-part test required to be met for severe distress recovery is a difficult 
standard for plaintiffs to achieve. Not just one or some of the elements must be 
met; they all must be proven by the plaintiff. That the court recognized the 
distress tort's rigorous proof requirements in Rafferty gives credence to their 
similar declaration in Falwell that meeting the intent test for. distress satisfies the 
stringent intent requirement of the New York Times actual malice standard.52 
Time. Inc. v. Firestone is a Supreme Court case that commentators often cite 
as evidence that even though a libel claim fails, a plaintiff can recover for her 
mental suffering.53 Mary Alice Firestone. wife of the head of the Firestone 
corporation. sued Time Magazine for erroneously printing that her divorce had 
been granted in part on grounds that she was an adulteress. She withdrew her 
libel claim on the eve of trial, but still the jury awarded her $100,000 in damages. 
It is logical to assume that the jury saw fit to compensate her for mental anguish 
and the effect Ms. Firestone claimed the article would have on her young son.54 
The Supreme Court thus upheld an apparent recovery for emotional anguish even 
where the plaintiff did not succeed with a libel claim. 
The only case to date in which a court clearly rejected a cause of action for 
libel but nevertheless awarded plaintiff damages for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress is Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club.55 The suit arose 
out of an article by a sports columnist reporting that Chuy, a retired Philadelphia 
Eagles football player, was stricken with polycythemia vera, a terminal disease. 
Chuy read the report in the paper and believed he must have the fatal disease, 
48 Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-220 (1981). 
49 Rafferty, 756 F.2d at 339. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 339 n.4. 
52 Falwell, 797 F.2d 1270, 1275 (4th Cir. 1986). 
53 424 U.S. 448 (1976). 
54 Mead, Suing Media, supra note 9, at 46. 
55 595 F.2d 1265 (3d Cir. 1979). 
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although his own doctor had never informed him he had it. The doctor who told 
the sportswriter of Chuy's condition was mistaken; thus the writer printed a 
falsity. Chuy was so upset by the report that he refused to be tested to confirm 
the inaccuracy and spent several months anguishing over the possibility of his 
imminent death.56 Chuy sued the doctor and the writer for libel and intentional 
infliction of mental distress. 
Because the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found Chuy 
to be a public figure, he had to establish actual malice on the sportswriter's part 
for libel recovery. The jury found that the sportswriter did not act with reckless 
disregard or entertain serious doubts of the truth of his story. Regarding the 
doctor, the court found no libel because the medical declaration did nothing to 
lower Chuy's reputation in the eyes of the community; rather the court found the 
publication would evoke sympathy from the public, not scorn or rejection. 
Regarding Chuy's emotional distress claim, the Court of Appeals noted that 
Pennsylvania had accepted the independent legal vitality of the distress tort. 
Defendant's conduct satisfied the tort requirements because the doctor knew or 
could have known that when he told the press that Chuy had a fatal disease, 
knowing he did not, a finding of extreme and outrageous conduct was possible. 
The jury found that the doctor's conduct went beyond all bounds of decency.57 
Chuy recovered nothing for libel because his reputation was not damaged, but he 
collected $15,000 for intentional infliction of emotional distress. On its face then, 
Chuy seems to lend direct support to the Fourth Circuit decision in Falwell 
allowing distress recovery in the face of a failed libel cause of action. 
The Fourth circuit has hinted in at least one case prior to Falwell that intent 
may be an important element in adjudging a libel claim. Their words in the past 
arguably show their similar treatment of intent under libel and intent under 
emotional distress, explaining the outcome of Falwell. In Time. Inc. v. Johnston 58 
Sports Illustrated published an article about "Sportsman of the Year" Bill Russell. 
One section of the piece recited how Russell had "destroyed" another player, 
Johnston, on the basketball court by outplaying him and psychologically 
intimidating him. Johnston sued the author for libel claiming that the article had 
damaged him in his chosen profession which was coaching basketball. Although 
Johnston lost his libel suit, the Fourth Circuit may have given a hint as to what 
direction it was moving in its discussion of intent of the publisher of the article. 
The court noted that the author writing about Russell did not intend to convey 
that Russell literally destroyed Johnston, but merely used hyperbole as an 
interesting way to present his story. Within the Johnston opinion the court cited 
Greenbelt Co-op Pub. Ass'n v. Bresler59 in which use of the word blackmail was 
not intended to charge the plaintiff with the commission of a crime, and Curtis 
56 Id. 
57 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46, comment d (\965). 
58 448 F.2d 378 (4th Cir. 1971). 
59 398 U.S. 6, 14 (1970). 
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Pub. Co. v. Birdsong60 in which use of the term "bastard" was not actually meant 
to say that the subject was actually born out of wedlock. The Fourth Circuit thus 
favors an examination of intent in determining possible defamation liability. 
Finally, a 1984 California case cited in plaintiff's opening brief in Falwell may 
further support a court's examination of intent or motive under both emotional 
distress and libel claims. In Koch v. Goldway61 plaintiff sued defendant, his 
political opponent, for libeling him and severely distressing him by making a vague 
suggestion that plaintiff might be a Nazi war criminal. The District Court for the 
Central District of California 
dismissed the libel claim because the statement was nonactionable opinion, but 
went on to inquire into the intent of the speaker in regards to the emotional 
distress claim. Finding that the facts did not reveal an "intent to cause, or a 
reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress,,62 the distress 
claim failed too. The fact that the court continued to search the facts for a basis 
for distress recovery nowithstanding a failed libel claim arguably supports the 
separateness approach which was used by the Fourth Circuit in Falwell. 
Treating the torts of emotional distress and defamation as independent may 
not necessarily forfeit first amendment interests. The instances in which a jury 
will find speech or conduct outrageous and distress severe will be few. In those 
few cases, however, a plaintiff still must prove intent to cause distress. 
Confessions by defendants of intent to distress a plaintiff will be rare. Larry 
Flynt's emphatic deposition is almost certainly a once in a lifetime gift to the 
plaintiff's attorney in an emotional distress suit.63 The court in Falwell points out 
that emotional distress tort requires intentional or reckless misconduct by the 
defendant. The court declared that 
[t)his is precisely the level of fault that New York Times requires in an 
action for defamation. The first amendment will not shield such misconduct 
resulting in damage to reputation, and neither will it shield such misconduct 
which results in severe emotional distress. We, therefore, hold that when the 
first amendment requires application of the actual malice standard, the 
standard is met when the jury finds that the defendant's intentional or 
reckless misconduct has proximately caused the injury complained of. The 
jury made such a finding here, and thus the constitutional standard is 
sa tisfied. 64 
Treating libel and emotional distress independently therefore does not sacrifice 
first amendment concerns. This approach does not place a blanket prohibition on 
recovery for emotional distress in spite of a failed libel claim. Legitimate injuries 
60 360 F.2d 344, 348 (5th Cir. 1966). 
61 607 F.Supp. 223 (C.D. Cal. 1984). 
62 [d. at 226. 
63 Smith, Note, (concerning Falwell and the believability of fact requirement) 
(available from WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW) (unpublished manuscript) (1987-88) 
64 Falwell, 797 F.2d at 1275. 
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consequently do not go unredressed. 
The Contingency Approach 
Language in the Koch case can support an approach different from the 
separateness approach taken in Falwell. In Koch, the court said that "lilt is 
incongruous to classify a statement, for purposes of defamation, as a 
constitutionally protected statement of opinion, but then determine that the same 
statement is so outrageous that it justifies recovery for intentional inflicition of 
emotional distress."65 Koch suggests that when a libel claim is coupled with a 
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress the latter claim's fate is 
contingent on the success of the former. If a plaintiff proves libel then he may 
collect for distress as well. If a court rejects a libel claim a plaintiff cannot use 
emotional distress as a basis for recovery. The contingency approach is 
conditioned on the existence of either a public figure plaintiff or subject matter of 
public interest and that the communication in question not be false statements of 
fact. Suits involving private figure plaintiffs or private matters have a lower 
threshold of proof than constitutional actual malice. In the same way, publications 
that convey false statements of fact do not leave the defense of truth to 
defendants, and plaintiffs will be one step closer to recovery. 
The first amendment protects speech from prosecution or repression with few 
limited exceptions.66 Speech that libels someone by damaging his reputation is not 
protected. When speech is not defamatory, however, and does not fall under one 
of the other categories of unprotected speech, courts should leave the 
communication undisturbed. To punish defendants for speech that emotionally 
distresses someone opens up a whole new category of speech left unprotected by 
the first amendment. The courts and constitutional scholars may not be ready for 
such a departure from the New York Times rule. 
Under the Court's reasoning in Gertz "[h)owever pernicious an opinion may 
seem, we depend on its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but 
on 'the competition of other ideas."67 One of the policies underlying first 
amendment freedom of speech is' to encourage "uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open"68 debate, a principal to be kept in mind when considering 
punishment for speech some may find distressing and outrageous. The Supreme 
Court has said even "vulgar" communications receive first amendment protection.69 
As with the separateness approach the contingency method on what interests 
a court deems to have priority: an individual's interest in personal peace of mind, 
65 Koch v. Goldway, 607 F.Supp. 223, 226 (C.D. Cal. 1984). 
66 See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text. 
67 Gertz, 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (l974). 
68 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (l964). 
69 Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 518 (1948). 
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or a constitutional interest in protecting freedom of speech. The appeal of the 
contingency approach is that constitutional rights will assume top priority while 
individual interests in peace of mind are sacrificed in only a few limited situations: 
when a public figure or private figure with a matter of public interest sues on a 
communication not asserting false statements of fact the plaintiff will nol recover 
for distress because he has not been libeled. Private figures are thus still 
protected (unless the communication is a matter of general public interest). Public 
figures will still recover if a defendant knowingly published lies about them. 
The contingency approach is consistent with the Supreme Court's standard of 
lesser protection for public figures. 70 The political arena is a particularly 'public' 
place. Hurt feelings are part and parcel of political debate. Public officials and 
figures who purposely take part in the discourse voluntarily subject themselves to 
"the vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks·71 that may 
distress some individuals.72 Moreover, public officials and figures have ready 
access to the media to respond to and rebut criticism against them. 
The Fourth Circuit in Falwell satisfied itself thatconstitutional issues were 
not a problem in awarding recovery for emotional distress absent a successful 
defamation claim. Focusing on the test of New York Times, the court said that the 
heart of the actual malice standard is culpability--whether a defendant's 
misconduct was knowing or reckless.73 The Fourth Circuit equates constitutional 
actual malice with the first prong of the test for common law severe emotional 
distress. 
The test of New York Times and its progeny is whether a defendant published 
a statement knowing it was false or with reckless disregard of the truth or falsity 
of the statement.14 The Court has said a defendant must have entertained serious 
doubts as to the truth of his publication to be guilty oflibel.75 The Fourth Circuit 
chose to focus on the intent and reckless disregard portion of the actual malice 
test, ignoring the requirement of falsity of the publication. Therein lies the flaw 
in the court's reasoning under the second approach. The most meaningful 
support for the theory of the contingency approach is found in a case that facially 
supported the separateness approach, Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club.16 
Chuy did not prove he was libeled, yet still recovered $15,000 for emotional 
distress. Chuy was not libeled because his reputation was not lowered in the eyes 
70 Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc: v. Hepps, 106 S. Ct. 1558 (1986). 
71 [d. at 1561. 
72 Falwell v. Flynt, 805 F.2d 484, 485 (4th Cir. 1985). 
73 Falwell, 797 F.2d at 1275. 
74 See, e.g., supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text. 
75 St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 u.S. 727 (1968). 
76 595 F.2d 1265 (3d Cir.1979). 
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of third parties. He suffered severe distress, however, because he believed the 
publication that asserted he had a fatal disease. The crucial point is that the 
article asserted false statements of fact. The article was believable, unlike Falwell 
in which the jury found no one would reasonably believe the ad parody to be 
asserting statements of fact.?7 Because Chuy was only allowed to recover on a 
distress claim in which he was a public figure and the publication was a believable 
lie, all first amendment concerns of not punishing protected speech were satisfied. 
Knowinglypublished lies are never protected. Conversely, the Falwell 
communication was not a lie, but a joke. 
Pring v. Penthouse International. Ltd.78 a case from the Tenth Circuit 
supports the notion that a communication must be believable; in other words, false 
statements of fact must be asserted for any recovery on the speech. The Tenth 
Circuit noted that the test for liability is not whether the speech was labeled as 
"humor" or "fiction" but whether a reader would reasonably understand the 
publication "as describing actual facts about the plaintiff or actual events in which 
she participated."79 The published story in Pring lampooned the Miss America 
contest and described how Miss Wyoming imagined she would win because of her 
special talent. That talent was causing men to levitate as she performs an act of 
fellatio on them. The article describes Miss Wyoming doing these acts on national 
television. The real Miss Wyoming in the Miss America contest sued Penthouse 
magazine for defamation, invasion of privacy (false light) and intentional infliction 
of emotional distress.80 
Ruling for Penthouse, the court described the article as rhetorical hyperbole 
and obviously a complete fantasy.81 No one would take the article literally or as 
conveying statements of fact. Miss Wyoming thus had no claim for libel recovery 
because the story contained no falsity because it was not believable. The facts of 
Pring are remarkably similar to- the facts of Falwell, yet the outcome entirely 
opposite. The Fourth Circuit in Falwell failed to address the falsity or 
believability of ad parody and focused solely on Flynt's intent as evidenced by his 
deposition. Yet the Tenth Circuit in Pring declared that "[ilt would serve no 
useful purpose to treat separately the ... 'outrageous conduct' doctrine ... as 
the same First Amendment considerations must be applied."82 Constitutional actual 
malice (intentional or reckless disregard of the truth) thus does not equal common 
law malice of emotional distress (ill will or spite). Meeting the first prong of the 
emotional distress test does not satisfy all constitutional concerns. The 
77 Falwell, 797 F.2d at 1271. 
78 695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1132 (1983). 
79 Pring, 695 F.2d at 442. 
80 Id. at 440-42. 
81 Id. at 443. 
82 Id. at 442. 
129 
constitutional actual malice test must override and permeate all claims for 
recovery. 
If emotional distress claims do not rise and fall with accompanying defamation 
claims then defendants may be held liable for otherwise constitutionally protected 
opinion. An opinion cannot be libelous because an opinion is, never false. Yet 
under the second approach mere expression of opinion can be punishable and thus 
chilled if the opinion causes someone sever emotional distress. 
The Fourth Circuit in Falwell successfully evaded the implications of 
punishing constitutionally protected opinion through severe emotional distress 
recovery. The court simply said "[w)e need not consider whether the statements in 
Question constituted OplDlOn, as the issue is whether their publication was 
sufficiently outrageous to constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress."83 
It is fairly obvious though, that Flynt was conveying a highly unfavorable opinion 
of Falwell and his conservative political and ideological views. 
Writers, editorialists, cartoonists and the like convey their opinions of people 
publicly. Unflattering cartoons and spoofs about famous people appear in 
newspapers every day. Those who are lampooned regularly sue those newspapers. 
An example is Keller v. Miami Herald Publishing Co.84 in which a nursing home 
brought suit against The Miami Herald over a cartoon it published portraying 
gangsters in a decaying building identified as a nursing home which had been 
closed down by the state. The gangsters were shown holding moneybags. The 
caption read "Don't worry, Boss, we can always reopen it as a haunted house for 
the kiddies."85 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit said 
that "cartoonists employ hyperbole, exaggeration, and caricature to communicate 
their messages to the reader. One cannot reasonably interpret a cartoon as 
literally depicting an actual event or situation .... Rather the cartoonist must be 
viewed as having utilized the art of exaggeration to express [his opinion)."86 The 
Eleventh Circuit's reasoning applies to the Falwell case and is consistent with the 
contingency approach. Only looking at whether an individual was "distressed" by a 
cartoon or spoof ignores important first amendment protections for opinion. 
Courts should not treat emotional distress claims and defamation claims as 
separate and distinct entities because the former ignores precedent of 
constitutional dimension that goes to great lengths to preserve freedom of speech. 
The test for malice is not the same under each cause of action as the Fourth 
Circuit believes. The same interests are not protected by each, and when both are 
brought in a suit, the federal constitutional interest in freedom of speech must 
override the state created common law interest in protecting an individual's peace 
of mind. 
83 Falwell, 797 F.2d at 1276. 
84 778 F.2d 711 (1985). 
85 [d. at 713. 
86 [d. at 712. 
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The Balancing Approach 
The third approach utilizes a sort of two-tiered balancing of instances in 
which a mental distress claim survives a libel claim. If a court is satisfied that a 
plaintiff hasfulfilled all the requirements for recovery for emotionaldistress then a 
second inquiry is in order. The court will examine the particular speech at issue 
and determine its overall value in light of the goals of ensuring freedom of speech. 
For example, the court may find the speech to be educational or informative, or, it 
may find it to be merely entertaining or even exploitive. The court should then 
weigh the interest in protecting the type of speech against the individual's interest 
in recovering for damage to peace of mind. If the speech is the type that the 
first amendment was originally meant to promote then the plaintiff will lose on his 
emotional distress claim. If, on the other hand, the speech is of little value and it 
contributes little to the marketplace of ideas then a plaintiff's interest in peace of 
mind will rise above constitutional concerns and he can recover for distress. This 
balancing approach is a compromise between the separateness and contingency 
approach, not entirely sacrificing individual interest to constitutional interest or 
vice-versa. Moreover, Falwell is consistent with a balancing analysis. 
The ad parody Hustler published was at best a tasteless joke and probably 
offensive to most people. The Fourth Circuit did not find the jury's conclusion 
erroneous that Falwell's distress was severe and that he fulfilled the four distress 
requirements. Having proven severe distress, then the court should have weighed 
Falwell's interests against the value of the speech at issue and concluded Falwell's 
interest in recovery outweighed any educational, informative or literary value the 
ad parody could possibly or remotely have. 
This approach is not revolutionary or sUrprising. The Supreme Court has 
been making judgments as to speech's value for many years. Child pornography 
has no value for the Court87 and commercial speech only limited value.88 The 
Court holdspolitical speech, however, in high regard.89 Depending on how 
important the speech is, the Court allows either minimal or substantial regulation 
of the speech. 
The Fourth Circuit has suggested that only normal orlegitimate hyperbole falls 
under constitutional protection.90 While the court found the Sports Illustrated 
article in Time. Inc. v. Johnston91 to be normal stylistic use of exaggeration, one 
can infer from the opinion that gross or perverse distortion of a public figure's 
87 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). 
88 Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 
Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
89 See generally BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An 
Inquiry Into the Substance and Limits 0/ Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299 (1978). 
90 448 F.2d 378 (4th Cir. 1971). 
91 Id. 
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private life may not be shielded by the first amendment.92 
Sometimes constitutional priorities defeat recovery on otherwise libelous 
speech. In Hutchinson v. Proxmire,93 the plaintiff sued Senator William Proxmire 
for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress arising out the 
Senator's awarding plaintiff the "Golden Fleece of the Month Award" for wasteful 
government spending. The plaintiff was ascientist who used government funds to 
study emotional behavior and aggression in animals. He claimed that as a result of 
the nationwide pUblicity of him receiving the undesirable award his academic and 
professional standing had been damaged and he had suffered severe distress.94 
The Seventh Circuit ruled in Senator Proxmire's favor holding that the 
statements were constitutionally protected by the Speech or Debate Clause95, and 
thus the alleged defamatory statements were privileged. The Supreme Court 
reversed, but on the grounds that the statements were not made on the floor of 
Congress or in Congressional debate and thus were not protected under Speech or 
Debate Clause immunity. The Court seemed to say that if the statements had 
fallen under that qualified privilege the plaintiff would have no recognizable claim 
for recovery. The importance of constitutional qualified privilege in that instance 
outweighed the plaintiff's interest in recovery for injury to his peace of mind. 
Because the speech was so important, individual interest had to be sacrificed. As 
the Seventh Circuit noted in regards to plaintiff's emotional distress claim "[w]e 
view these additional allegations of harm as merely the results of the statements 
made by the defendants. If the alleged defamatory falsehoods themselves are 
privileged, it would defeat the privilege to allow recovery for the specified 
damages which they caused."96 
Critique of the balancing approach 
A two-tiered type of balancing approach poses some unique problems. 
Whereas the foregoing analyses of the separateness approach and the contingency 
approach reflect the advantages and disadvantages of each other, the balancing 
approach requires a separate critique. First, although this observation may apply 
to the first two approaches as well, the quality and quantity of proof needed to 
establish severity of emotional distress may be declining if Falwell is any 
indication of the current trend. The only evidence Falwell presented of the 
severity of his distress was his own assertion that the ad caused him anguish. In 
addition, a colleague of his testified that Falwell's enthusiasm seemed to have 
92 !d. at 380. 
93 579 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 443 U.S. III (1979). 
94 Id. 
95 U.S. Const. art. I, § 6, 
96 Proxmire, 579 F.2d at 1035. 
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diminished after he saw the Hustler ad.97 Such subjective, self-serving testimony 
should not be sufficient to establish "severe" distress. Falwell's distress does not 
come close to the examples of severe distress cited in the Restatement of Torts.98 
A ready finding of severe distress comes close to a situation where first. 
amendment freedoms may be unnecessarily sacrificed. 
Several commentators99 argue that although the tort of mental distress is 
composed of four elements, they blur into one determining factor--the 
outrageousness of the defendant'sconduct. The jury has no objective guide in 
judging what speech is outrageous; their decision is based on a subjective "gut 
feeling" more than anything else. The Restatement of Torts merely states the test 
as whether the conduct would arouse the ire of the average member of the 
community.IOO 
A substantial danger exists in hinging first amendment freedoms on local 
community standards. Legitimate criticisms of public figures may be punished 
simply because members of a particular jury find the criticism offensive. One 
commentator postulates that tort liability should not be imposed on what might be 
found to be extreme and outrageous conduct or speech because censorship of 
unpopular ideas will result. IOI Juries can simply chill speech by imposing liability 
for ideas or utterances they view as outrageous. 102 An example of the resulting 
97 Falwell, 797 F.2d at 1277. 
98 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1965). The fact that Falwell 
reproduced the parody and included it in his religious mailings brings the sincerity 
of his distress into question! 
99 Givelber, The Right to Minimum Social Decency and the Limits of 
Evenhandedness: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by· Outrageous 
Conduct, 82 COLUM L. REV. 42 (1982); Note, First Amendment Limits on Tort 
Liability for Words Intended to Inflict Severe Emotional Distress, 85 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1749, 1750-51 (1985) [hereinafter Note, First Amendment Limits on Emotional 
Distress]. 
100 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 comment d (1965). 
101 Note, First Amendment Limits on Emotional Distress, supra note 99, at 1761. 
102 An obvious danger arises when community standards become the sole 
determinant factor a jury uses when deciding whether a defendant will be punished 
for his speech. Author Richard Bernstein had this to say about the tort of 
emotional distress being applied to the first amendment: 
First, extreme and outrageous language will often be associated with 
unpopular ideas (and in the Falwell case an unpopular defendant as well). 
Second, it will be very difficult for an appellate court to determine whether 
it is such language or rather the accompanying message that is the real 
object of the trier of fact's disapproval. The Supreme Court is not likely to 
find that judges and juries can be relied on to divorce their perceptions of 
what kind of language is extreme and outrageous from their perceptions of 
what ideas are extreme and outrageous .. 
Allowing unfettered regulation of these utterances that can be 
characterized as extreme and outrageous would produce even greater 
opportunities to censor unpopular ideas. 
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self-censorship can be seen in the recent pulling of the Doonsebury comic strip 
from many papers across the country because the "Sleaze Parade" series was judged 
to be in poor taste and possibly defamatory. The strip portrayed members of the 
Reagan Administration that were fired or left under suspicious circumstances. One 
editor commented that their largely conservative readership might find the cartoon 
objectionable. 103 The possibility of being sued over thecartoons' publication likely 
played a role in their decision to pull the strip. 
A look at the language of Cohen v. Cali/ornia l04 may be helpful in 
understanding the danger the Supreme Court has recognized in allowing 
government to regulate communications as offensive or profane. The Court 
predicted that government could stifle the expression of unpopular views under the 
guise of censoring offensive or profane words. 105 Again the Supreme Court 
emphasized that freedom of expression warrants great protection. "One of the 
perogatives of American citizenship is the right to criticize public men and 
measures--and that means not only informed and responsible criticism but the 
freedom to speak foolishly and without moderation.',106 The Court in Cohen noted 
too that words are selected as much for their emoti ve force as their cogni ti ve 
force. 107 
Fear of juries running roughshod over freedom of speech may be overblown. 
At the same time the Supreme Court gave communities power to decide what was 
obscene and what was not, the Court limited jury discretion to do so. In Jenkins 
v. Georgia l08 a jury found the film Carnal Knowledge to be obscene and thus 
Note, First Amendment Limits on Emotional Distress, supra note 99, at 1759. 
The Restatement directs the trier of fact to use the following guide for the 
tort of emotional distress: 
Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in 
character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of 
decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized 
community. Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to 
an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the 
actor and lead him to exclaim: "Outrageous!" 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 46 comment d (1965). 
103 Suits Over Cartoons Chill Commentary, The News Media & The Law, 
Summer 1986 at 14. 
104 403 U.S. 15 (1971). In Cohen a young man was convicted for wearing a 
jacket that displayed the phrase "Fuck the Draft" on it. He wore the jacket inside 
a courthouse. The Supreme Court overturned his conviction saying that what some 
may find offensive may be another man's lyric. [d. at 25. 
105 [d. at 26. 
106 [d. (quoting Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 673-74 (1944». 
107 Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26. 
108 418 U.S. 153 (1974). 
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prohibited its showing in local theaters. The Supreme Court reversed, declaring 
that juries do not have unbridled discretion in determining what is patently 
offensive.109 Mere scenes of nudity did not qualify the film as obscene. The 
Court therefore overrode community standards, second-guessing a jury finding. 
The Court may feel compelled to do the same if a jury, for example, finds a simple 
insult to constitute extreme and outrageous conduct. Juries thus may not have 
complete discretion in judging the legitimacy of an emotional distress claim. 
Allowing courts to choose certain types of speech over others on the basis of 
the inherent value of the speech is arguably against much precedent, especially for 
speech similar to that in Falwell. The following quote from Pring v. Penthouse I 10 
with facts similar to Falwell illustrates the point well. 
The story is a gross, unpleasant, crude, distorted attempt to ridicule the Miss 
America contest and contestants. It has no redeeming features whatever. 
There is no accounting for the vast divergence in views and ideas. However, 
the First Amendment was intended to cover them all. The First Amendment 
is not limited to statements, or positions which are accepted; which are not 
outrageous; which are decent and popular; which are constructive or have 
some redeeming element; or which do not deviate from community standards 
and norms; or which are within prevailing religious or moral standards. 
Although a story may be repugnant in the extreme to an ordinary reader, and 
we have encountered no difficulty in placing this story in such a category, 
the typical standards and doctrines under the First Amendment must 
nevertheless be applied . . . . The First Amendment standards are not 
adjusted to a particular type of publication or particular subject matter. I I I 
This lengthy but enlightening passage directly conflicts with the analytical 
method of the balancing approach--judging the value of the speech in question to 
determine whether it deserves protection in the face of an emotional distress 
claim. In sum, the third approach is appealing because it strikes a compromise and 
falls between the extremes of the first two approaches. At the same time, some 
will feel that individual interests in mental peace are not given enough weight, 
while first amendment champions will be disturbed by possible speech repression. 
Conclusion 
Plaintiffs are pleading intentional infliction of emotional distress as well as 
defamation in increasing numbers. 112 Courts should try to establish a uniform 
method for handling situations where a libel claim fails but an emotional distress 
claim survives based on the same facts. This article advances three approaches to 
resolution of this problem. 
First, a court may follow Falwell and treat distress and libel as totally 
separate, independent claims. Second, a court can declare a distress claim's 
success to be contingent on the establishment of a viable libel claim, given that a 
109 [d. at 160. 
110 695 F.2d 438 (I982). 
III [d. at 443. 
112 See supra note 9. 
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public figure or matter. of public interest is involved and no false facts are 
asserted in the communication. Third, a court may employ a two-tiered balancing 
test. Upon satisfaction of emotional distress elements a court will then determine 
the value of the speech at issue. If the speech is valuable plaintiff's distress 
claim must fail. If the speech holds little value then plaintiff's distress claim will 
survive a failed libel claim. This author favors the contingency approach primarily 
because constitutional guarantees of freedom in the Bill of Rights are the basis of 
our entire legal system. Not repressing bad speech ensures that good speech will 
be heard as well. It is unfortunate but necessary that a few severely distressed 
plaintiffs will suffer in the wake of first amendment guarantees. 
As Judge Wilkinson accurately points out "Hustler magazine is a 
singularly unappealing beneficiary of First Amendment value and serves only to 
remind us of the costs a democracy must pay for its most precious privilege of 
open political debate."113 Few would deny that the ad parody in dispute was 
tasteless and ridiculous. At the same time its publication did not defame Falwell. 
To disallow Falwell's libel claim while allowing recovery under his emotional 
distress claim creates an end run around the requirement of constitutional actual 
malice for defamation recovery. To permit recovery under a tort of a different 
name asserted on the exact same set of facts defeats the purpose of the first 
amendment and the license it gives us for uninhibited debate. 
The decision in Falwell v. Flynt undoubtedly chills the exercise of free 
speech. The idea behind freedom of speech is that good speech will correct bad 
speech and that competition of ideas is healthy. The marketplace is the means to 
regulate political speech. In this instance the Reverend Falwell as a public figure 
has immediate, practically unlimited access to media channels to respond to Flynt's 
communication. 
If the thrust of New York Times and its progeny is indeed intent, fault, and 
culpability as a basis for liability then' the Fourth Circuit has interpreted the law 
correctly. Maybe Falwell is an exceptional case and only publications like the ad 
parody, which admittedly hold little if any literary or informational value, will 
come under the rule of recovery for emotional distress. Unfortunately, Falwell 
may only be the first step down a slippery slope leading to pre-New York Times 
era when ill will was enough to, punish a publisher for communicating something 
that was not false. 
If the real heart of New York Times is truth or falsity of a communication 
then the Fourth Circuit has made an unfortunate mistake. Dangerous precedent 
has been set in Falwell. To allow a public figure plaintiff to recover merely 
because his feelings were hurt necessarily means that plaintiffs could recover for 
true statements. Such a result is without precedent and flies in the face of the 
purpose of the first amendment. Placing in the hands of the jury the discretion to 
determine whether someone can be punished for expression that does not fall under 
community standard of acceptability or non-offensiveness surely means that "we 
have entered a brave new world of First Amendment jurisprudence."114 
113 Falwell, 805 F.2d at 484. 
114 [d. at 488. 
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